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If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union, or to
change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monu-
ments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated
where reason is left free to combat it.
Thomas Jefferson1
This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that




International law is increasingly concerned with national transitions
to democratic government. The holding of free and fair elections alone,
however, provides no guarantee that a democratic system will become
firmly established and capable of resisting challenges by anti-demo-
cratic actors. The question thus arises of how intolerant a democracy
may become toward such actors in order to preserve itself without
relinquishing the claim of being democratic. This problem has arisen
on a number of occasions, perhaps the most dramatically upon the
cancellation of the second round of the Algerian elections in early
1992.
This Article explores the legal issues raised by the presence of
anti-democratic actors in an otherwise generally .'free and fair" electoral
process. The Article first examines two models of democratic govern-
ment-the procedural and the substantive-which take opposite per-
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1. Thomas Jefferson, First Draft of the Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS
OF THOmAS JEFFERSON 1, 3 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897).
2. "Das wird immer einer der besten Witze der Demokratie bleiben, dass sie ihren Todfeinden
die Mittel selber stellte, dutch die sie vernichret wurde," quoted in NATIONALsOzIALIsTISCHE
DIKTATUR 16 (Karl Dietrich Bracher et al. eds., 1983).
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 36
spectives on the permissibility of excluding anti-democratic actors.
Using these models as organizing themes, it then examines the practice
of a number of democratic states and the jurisprudence of international
human rights regimes. The Article concludes that both national and
international practice favor a substantive model of democracy, which
holds that the long-term survival of democratic institutions outweighs
short-term deprivation of political rights to anti-democratic actors.
Having reached this general conclusion, the Article goes on to examine
the standards required under international human rights law for the
exclusion of such actors and the type of conduct that might justify a
ban. Finally, the Article asks whether states that have obligations under
human rights treaties to guarantee democratic government are now
legally required to exclude anti-democratic actors if the integrity of
their democratic institutions is at stake. The Article concludes that
such a requirement does exist, though its concrete meaning will differ
greatly from state to state.
I. INTRODUCTION
How to define "democracy" has remained one of the fundamental
questions of political theory, engaging statesmen and philosophers in
debate since ancient times. The issue has only recently been addressed
in a serious way by international lawyers. Scholars such as Thomas
Franck now claim that a distinct right to participate in government-a
"democratic entitlement"-is emerging as an internationally protected
human right.3 The task that Franck and others have set for themselves
is nothing less than to define democracy in a global context, as their
works seek to identify an international consensus on a set of core
"democratic" principles.
That international law should have any role in prescribing the
makeup of domestic political institutions is remarkable in itself.4 How-
3. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 A. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992). See also JAMES CRAWFORD, DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW INAUGURAL LECTURE',
WHEWELL PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994); Jochen Abr. Frowein, Demokratie tnd
Vdlkerrecht in Europa, V6LKERRECHT ZWISCHEN NORMATIVEMi ANSPRUCH UND POLITISCHER
RFALiTX. FESTSCHRiFT FOR KARL ZEMANEK 365-75 (1994); David Padilla & Elizabeth Houp-
pert, International Election Observing: Enhancing the Principle of Free and Fair Elections, 7 EIORY INT'L
L. REV. 73 (1993); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992); Babacar Ndiaye, International Co-operation to Promote Demcracy and
Human Rights: Principles and Programmes, 49 Ray. INT'L COmm'N JURISTS 23 (1992); Jon M.
Ebersole, The United Nations' Response to Requests for Assistance in Electoral AMatters, 33 VA. J. INT'L
L. 91 (1992); David Stoelting, The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Indepcndent Nations, 28
STAN. J. INT'L L. 371 (1992); National Sovereignty Revisite. Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of
Democracy in International Law, 86 PROC. ANNUAL MTG. A. SOC. INT'L L. 249 (1992); Milida
N. Hodgson, Note, When to Accept, When to Abstain: A Framework for U.N. Election Monitoring, 25
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & PoL. 137 (1992).
4. As recently as 1987, the Restatement of Foreign Relations declared that "[i]nternational law
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ever, global and regional human rights instruments have spoken di-
rectly to this question for some time. Article 25 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Political Covenant), the gen-
eral human rights treaty to which the largest number of states cur-
rently subscribes, provides that "every citizen shall have the right and
the opportunity .. without unreasonable restrictions ... to vote and
to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors." 5 In delineating proper
electoral procedures, article 25 sets out a legal threshold of governmen-
tal legitimacy. As stated by one of the article's drafters, "no government
is valid unless it reposes on the will of the majority.' 6
For many years, article 25 and similar provisions of other human
rights treaties lay dormant as a consequence of Cold War tensions.
Their impact was marginalized by superpower support for so-called
"peoples' democracies" on the one hand and anti-communist dictator-
ships of the right on the other. Yet the transition to western forms of
democracy in virtually all the former socialist countries, as well as in
many developing countries, now makes it possible for the international
community to address the perennial question of what makes a state
"democratic." That this is a legitimate question for international law
is borne out by the practice of states and international institutions in
recent years.
does not generally address domestic constitutional issues, such as how a national government is
formed." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Op FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203,
cmt. e (1987).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, art.
25, S. ExEc. Doc. E, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978); 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter
Political Covenant]. For a detailed discussion of Article 25, see Fox, supra note 3, at 553-60. As
of July 30, 1993, there were 122 states parties to the Political Covenant. Report of the Human
Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., pt. 1, Supp. No. 40, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (1993).
Article 25 was modeled after the virtually identical article 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (IMI) (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
Other human rights instruments guaranteeing a right to political participation include the
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature Mar. 20, 1953, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, Europ. T.S. No. 9 (entered into force May
18, 1954) [Hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention on Human Rights, opened
for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 23, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force
July 18, 1978), [hereinafter American Convention]; the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, arc. 13, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 IL.M.
58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986); the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the
Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) ( 5.1-5A, 7.1-7.9); the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, art.
5(c), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Race
Convention]; and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, openedfor signature Mar. 3 1,
1953, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force for U.S. July 7, 1976).
6. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 16th Sess., 1097th mtg. at 186, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1097 (1961)
(statement of Mr. Ferreira Aldunate, Uruguay).
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The monitoring of national elections is now a regular activity of the
United Nations: a new Office of Electoral Assistance, created in 1992,
7
provided aid to thirty-two member states in the first year of its
operation.8 Other organs of the United Nations regularly express sup-
port for notions of democratic legitimacy.9 Regional organizations have
looked to the democratic nature of states as a criterion for initial or
continued membership. 10 Human rights tribunals are creating an in-
creasingly rich jurisprudence on the nature of democratic institutions,11
including ruling on such controversial questions as the legitimacy of
the one-party state.12 International lending institutions, notably the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, look to the quality
7. G.A. Res. 137, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49 U.N. Doc A1461609 at 209 (1991);
Report of the Secretary-General: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine
Elections, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., UN Doc. A/47/668, at 4 (1992) [hereinafter Electoral Assis-
tance Report]; Report of the Secretary-General Guidelines for Member States Considering the Formulation
of Requests for Electoral Assistance U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Addendum 1, U.N. Doc.
A/47/668/Add.1 at 1 (1992) [hereinafter Electoral Guidelines Report] (setting out uniform
guidelines for UN election observers).
8. Electoral Assistance Activities of United Nations System, U.N. Press Release GA/8481 (Apr, 16,
1993) (press release on file with author). In all of its prior history the UN had provided electoral
assistance to only two member states, Nicaragua and Haiti (though it had done so in numerous
colonial territories). Report of the Secretary-General: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic
and Genuine Elections U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc A1461609, at 10-16.
9. See S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mrg., U.N. Doc. SIRESI814 (1993)
(calling for "steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions" in
Somalia and expressing Council's readiness "to assist the people of Somalia ... to participate in
free and fair elections, with a view towards achieving and implementing a political settlement").
For the past four years the General Assembly has annually adopted resolutions entitled "Enhanc-
ing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections," most recently with no
dissenting votes. See G.A. Res. 138, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 214 (1992); G.A.
Res. 137, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. Supp. No. 49, at 209 (1991); G.A. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR
3d Comm., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 69, U.N. Doc. A/45/766, at 254 (1990); and G.A. Res. 146,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 225 (1989). Companion resolutions affirming the
importance of state sovereignty in electoral matters have also been adopted. See, e.g., G.A. Res.
471130 (1992).
10. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union provides that democracy and respect for human
rights, as set forth in the European Convention, shall be pre-conditions for membership in the
newly reconstituted European Union. Treaty on European Union, Title 1(0, 31 I.L.M. 247, 256
(1992). In December 1992 the Organization of American States amended its Charter to provide
for the suspension from the General Assembly of any member state whose "democratically
constituted government has been overthrown by force." OAS Charter, art. 8 bis; see OEA/Ser.P,
AG/doc.1 1 (XVI-E/92) rev.1 (1992). In a related fashion, the states of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe have pledged that in the event of an "overthrow or attempted
overthrow of a legitimately elected government of a participating state" they will "support
vigorously ... the legitimate organs of that State upholding human rights, democracy and the
rule of law." Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
the CSCE, art. 17.2, 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1677 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Final Report on Cases 9768, 9780 and 9828 of Mexico, in ANNUAL REPORT OP
THE INTER-AmERICAN COMMISSION ON HumAN RIGHTS 1989-90, at 116 (1990) (rejecting
Mexican claim that electoral matters fall within its exclusive domestic jurisdiction and affirming
Commission's right "to assess the relationship between popular will and the final results of the
electoral contest").
12. Bwalya v. Zambia, Commun. No. 314/1988, reprinted in 14 HUM. R's. IJ. 408 (1993)
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of the borrower's governance in making lending decisions.1 3 And both
international organizations and some states have based decisions to
recognize new states and regimes on their adherence to democratic
norms.14 In a March 1993 speech, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali summarized his perspective on democratic reforms:
[Diemocratization is the thread which runs through all the work
of the Organization. Within nations as much as within the family
of nations, democracy should underpin the structures of interna-
tional peace and security. Human rights, equal rights and govern-
ment under law are important attributes of democracy. With
participation, social and economic development become meaning-
fl; with freedom of speech and of thought civil institutions
become durable. Individual involvement in the political process
enhances the accountability and responsiveness of governments.
Governments which are responsive and accountable are likely to
be stable and to promote peace. 15
A. The Problem of Intolerant Democracies
For the international community to promote an effective guarantee
of political participation, it must agree on fundamental principles
governing electoral processes. In order to reach such agreement, the
community must begin to address certain crucial aspects of democratic
governance which have been debated for years within states attempting
to shape their domestic political institutions, but which have only
recently been of international concern.
("restrictions on political activity outside the only recognized political party amount to an
unreasonable restriction on the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs").
13. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was established to assist the
former communist states of Eastern Europe. The Bank's Charter provides that its lending policies
shall attempt to foster the growth of multiparty democracy. Agreement Establishing the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ch. 1, art. 1, 29 I.L.M. 1077, 1084 (1990).
14. Much of this activity came in response to developments in Haiti and the former Yugosla-
via. See MRE/RES.1/91; cor., at 2, OEA/ser.FN.1 (Oct. 3 1991) (declaring that the OAS would
recognize delegates from the Aristide government "as the only legitimate representatives of
Haiti"); G.A. Res. 7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 31st plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, at 13, U.N.-Doc.
A/46/L. 81 Rev. 1 (1991) (referring to the Aristide regime as "legitimate" and the coup as
"illegal"); Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States,
Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1487 (1992) (in order to be recognized by EC member states,
former Yugoslav republics must demonstrate respect for, inter alia, "the rule of law, democracy
and human rights'). See U.S. Approaches to Changes in the Soviet Union, 2 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
No. 36 (Sept. 9, 1991) at 667; US Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics, 3 U.S. DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH Supp. No. 7 (Sept. 1992) at 19; U.S. Recognition of Angolan Government, 4 U.S. DEP'T
ST. DISPATCH No. 21 (May 24, 1993) at 375.
15. BouTRos BOumos-GHAu, MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: THE
UNITED NATIONS AS FORUMs AND FOCAL POINT (Mar. 25, 1993) (mimeographed document on
file with author).
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This Article will focus on the issue of what we call intolerant
democracies. Such an issue arises when a democratic country takes
restrictive measures to prevent the change of its own democratic char-
acter by the election of anti-democratic parties. This is a particularly
troublesome aspect of the right to democratic government which has
become evident as issues of state governance move from the exclusive
realm of national constitutional law to the purview of international
human rights law. It is an issue that tests the core of the international
community's commitment to popularly elected government, and is
therefore fundamental to its understanding of what constitutes a "de-
mocracy.
B. The Algerian Example
On December 26, 1991, Algeria held its first multiparty election in
thirty years. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won 189 of the 231
parliamentary seats distributed in the first round of the elections. This
margin of victory virtually assured the FIS of winning sufficient addi-
tional seats in the second round to attain the two-thirds parliamentary
majority necessary to ratify constitutional amendments. 16 The elections
were generally thought to be free from serious irregularities. 17 The FIS,
founded in 1989,18 made clear during the election that if victorious it
intended to remake Algeria into an Islamic state. While FIS leaders
issued contradictory statements as to whether their plans included
holding future elections, several expressed open hostility toward mul-
tiparty democracy.19
16. Human Rights in Algeria Since the Halt of the Electoral Process, MIDDLE E. WATCH, Feb. 1992,
at 3 [hereinafter Human Rights in Algeria).
17. Id
18. Article 40 of Algeria's revised constitution, introduced in 1989, prohibited the formation
of political parties based on religion, linguistic differences, or regional identities. The government
chose not to enforce this provision against the FIS and several other religious and ethnic parties.
Hugh Roberts, The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy, 27 Gov'T. & O'. 433, 450 n.10
(1992).
19. For example, in early January FIS leader Iman Abdelkader Moghni told an audience at a
mosque, "Islam is light. Why do you fear it? It is in democracy that darkness lies. Those who
refuse the light want to create injustice in society." Human Rights in Algeria, supra note 16, at
13. FIS deputy chief All Belhadj reacted to the prospect of a pluralist Algeria by declaring: "If
the Berber activist expresses himself, the communist expresses himself, along with everyone else,
then our country will become a battleground of diverse ideologies in contradiction with the hopes
of our people." Id Other more theoretical, but no less aggressive attacks on democracy by Ali
Belhadj are compiled in VALGRms PAR SFs IsL.ziISTES 87-100 (Mustafa AI-Ahnaf e al. eds.,
1991). According to one commentator:
Few were convinced that the FIS, once in power, would respect the multi-party system.
Statements by the party such as 'democracy is blasphemy' and 'no charter, constitution, just
the word of Allah' did little to reassure Algerians that the country would be safe in
fundamentalist hands.
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Before the second round of voting could occur, however, President
Chadli Benjedid resigned and the Algerian army took effective control
of the country. A "High Security Council" announced itself to be in
charge and immediately canceled the second phase of the elections.20
Shortly thereafter, security forces carried out mass arrests of FIS mem-
bers, restricted political activities at mosques, and effectively shut
down several pro-FIS newspapers. 21 A state of emergency was declared
on February 9, 1992, and remains in effect to this day.2
2
The government's Minister for Human Rights, Ali Haroun, ex-
plained the crack-down as follows:
The FIS, which has at least shown some honesty and frankness in
this area, said that it is not democratic, that it is against democ-
racy, that it does not want democracy. It has said that when it
takes power there will be no more elections; there will be the
Shura, the religious men who meet together and decide on your
behalf .... As a minister of human rights, my question is: who
is there to defend the notion of human rights? Am I going to
allow a situation where, in a month or two, people will no longer
have any rights? I cannot do that. There are currently men in
Algeria who are assuming their responsibilities. There is a great
part of the population that feels reassured. We are going to take
the time to set up real institutions to lead this country toward
real democracy-not some pretext of using a democratic process
that ends up killing democracy.23
The Algerian crisis raises a familiar question in an unfamiliar con-
text: assuming Algeria was democratic at the time of the elections,
could it suspend the function of regular electoral procedures in order
to save the democratic system as a whole or at least preserve a demo-
cratic option? And in so doing, would it remain democratic? The many
facets of this question have been discussed throughout this century by
constitutional theorists.24 In the aftermath of World War II, some
countries adopted constitutions that explicitly responded to the prob-
lem. The importance of the Algerian case, however, is the context in
which it has taken place: Algeria's dilemma has arisen during an era
in which the relaxation of international tensions has made the appli-
Alfred Hermida, Democacy Derailed, AFRICA REPORT, Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 14; see also II WELT-
GESCHEHEN, 107 (1993).
20. Hermida, supra note 19, at 14-16.
21. Human Rights in Algeria, supra note 16, at 5-11.
22. Algeria Presents Timetable for a Return to Democracy, N.Y. T mEs, June 22, 1993, at A9;
Algeria: First Round to the Assassins, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, July 3, 1992, at 7.
23. Human Rights in Algeria, supra note 16, at 5.
24. See discussion infra part III.
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cation of pertinent international norms on this subject a realistic and
meaningful possibility.
With the end of the Cold War, liberal states, no longer preoccupied
by fear of communist subversion, have made democratic reforms a
centerpiece of their foreign policies. 25 But as the old opponents have
faded away, new ones have arisen. The more recent threats to demo-
cratic rule appear to come from groups that profess traditional but
undemocratic values and claim that their citizenry supports those
values. 26 Algeria is just one clear example of this trend. A number of
other states, many of them in their first years of independence, have
banned or restricted political parties that espouse religious, nationalist
or ethnic solidarity, perceiving them as antithetical to the democratic
order.27
The response of the international community to events such as the
elections in Algeria must start from the international obligations of
the state in question. Like many states, Algeria has ratified the Political
Covenant which requires state parties to hold regular and genuine
elections and to respect their results. 28 However, it is not clear if the
obligation to respect the democratic entitlement is enforceable as a
"suicide pact," forcing governments to hand over power to anti-demo-
cratic parties who win electoral majorities or pluralities. Even though
tolerance is a bedrock principle of democratic government, it may be
argued that where the survival of the democracy itself is threatened,
survival takes precedence over tolerance. On the other hand, the exclu-
sion or suppression of political parties based on their allegedly subver-
sive nature goes to the heart of the democratic process. While preser-
vation of democracy is a laudable goal, experience suggests that the
power to exclude groups from the political process is often exercised
arbitrarily and in a fashion that detracts from rather than enhances the
democratic character of the state.29
25. See, eg., Anthony Lake, From Containment to Enlargement, 4 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH No.
39 (Sept. 27, 1993) at 658.
26. For a recent survey of electoral gains by such groups in Europe, see The Rise of Europe's Far
Right, ECONOMIST, OCt. 15, 1994, at 40-41.
27. Christian Tomuschat, Democratic Pluralism: the Right to Political Opposition, in THEn STRNGTHt
OF DIVERSITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND PLURAuST DEMOCRACY 27, 35-37 (Allan Rosas & Jan
Helgesen eds., 1992).
28. Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 25. Algeria became a party to the Covenant in
September 1989. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1991, at 133, U.N. Sales No. E.92.V.4, at 133 (1992).
29. Middle East Watch, which issued a detailed report on the Algerian election and its
aftermath, took the position that the crack-down was impermissible. It argued that the mere
seating of FIS deputies in Parliament was not sufficient justification for cancelling the elections
and for the derogation from other human rights guarantees that followed. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1993 294 (1993).
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A resolution of the paradox should start by employing the relevant
principles of democratic theory and proceed to analyze the limits on a
government's power to protect the integrity of its electoral system. It
must be determined whether international human rights instruments
would allow states to invoke so-called "self-protection legislation,"
under which the rights of anti-democratic parties may be curtailed.
Absent such laws, is a state justified in cancelling elections during an
emergency?
This traditional constitutional inquiry-a search for limitations on
governmental authority-is the approach taken in Parts II-IV of this
Article. We will survey the practice of a representative group of demo-
cratic states on the question of self-protection legislation and review
global and regional human rights instruments to determine the per-
missible scope of such restrictions. But the international character of
this inquiry suggests that a second question must be asked: if a state
has committed itself by treaty to maintain a democratic system, is it
under an international obligation to enact self-protection legislation so
as to ensure the system is not subverted by authoritarian groups? In
Part V we ask whether the international community has a sufficient
interest in its members' remaining democratic to require them to take
affirmative steps to protect their fragile regimes from internal oppo-
nents.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Intolerant behavior by democratic governments can take various
forms. This Article is concerned only with the question of how a
democracy can protect itself against its enemies and still remain demo-
cratic. This inquiry excludes two other types of anti-democratic behav-
ior by elected governments which, while of concern to human rights
law, are not at issue here. The first is the abridgement of certain
individual rights through discrete legislative or executive acts. Such
laws may be targeted specifically at political opposition movements30
or the abridgment of rights may come as an unintended side-effect of
attempts to address more general social problems. 31 The second is
discrimination against specific racial, ethnic, religious, or other well-
defined minority groups who, by virtue of their limited numbers,
cannot seek redress through a majoritarian political process.
30. An example would be laws requiring political reform groups to disclose their membership
lists, thereby exposing the members to harassment and violence. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958) (forced disclosure of membership lists violates freedom of association).
31. An example would be certain types of campaign finance reform which in the United States
have been held to abridge political candidates' freedom of speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976) (striking down candidate expenditure limits).
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In both of these cases the majoritarian system continues to function
as intended: those who win elections gain control of the government.
In theory, at least, the government is still acting in the interest of those
citizens who elected it to office. The problem for human rights law
comes from the lack of anti-majoritarian checks on the government such
as those imposed by judicial review. By contrast, the problem of
anti-democratic actors involves the rejection (at least potentially) of
majority rule. In Algeria, if FIS statements are to be taken at face value,
it appears that a majority was about to deny itself the right to vote
again in the future. A central assumption of democratic theory is that
a regime unwilling to submit itself to electoral challenge cannot claim
democratic bona fides. According to the major human rights instru-
ments, regimes become suspect if the citizenry is not consulted regu-
larly.32 Thus, our problem can be described as involving oppressive
minority rule achieved by majoritarian means, rather than oppressive
majority rule brought about by majoritarian means.
The central historical example of this phenomenon is Hitler's rise
to power in Weimar Germany, which reveals the scope and complexity
of the problem with the benefit of historical perspective. The Weimar
constitution provided for proportional representation in the Reichstag.
While the Nazi Party won an increasing number of seats in the early
1930s, it never actually won a majority of seats.33 'In January 1933,
when Hitler was appointed Chancellor (head of government), the party
held slightly less than one-third of the' seats in the Reichstag, where
it was nevertheless the strongest party.3 4 Despite the Nazis' lack of a
governing majority, they succeeded in eroding support for the Republic
by working within established democratic institutions. Beginning with
elections in the summer of 1932, the Nazis held, together with the
Communist Party, a "negative" majority in the Reichstag. This allowed
them to block the formation of any government with parliamentary
support. 5 Under these circumstances, President Hindenburg first tried
to derail Hitler's rise to power by appointing minority chancellors and
allowing them to rule by presidential emergency legislation. After two
chancellors failed, however, Hindenburg was persuaded to appoint
32. This stems from the requirement of "periodic" elections. See Political Covenant, art. 25(b);
European Convention, art. 3; Americarn Convention, art 23(lXb); Universal Declaration, art.
21(3), supra note 5.
33. Before Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933, the Nazi high water mark
occurred in the elections of July 31, 1932 when the parry received 37.4% of the popular vote.
AJ. NCHOLLS, WmmAR AND THE RisE oF HITLER 136 (3d ed. 1991).
34. With 33.1% of the popular vote, which suggests that support for the Nazis actually
decreased from the elections four months earlier. Id. at 137.
35. The results of all Reichstag elections under the Weimar Constitution are contained in
Ergebnise der Wahlen im Reich 1919 his 1933, reprinted as Doc. No. 533 in IV DOKuMENTE ZUR
DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGSGnscHIcHTE 668 (E.R. Huber ed., 3d ed. 1991).
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Hider as chancellor of a coalition government with the motive that
Hitler's ultra-conservative coalition partners would contain him and
prevent the implementation of his then clearly evident agenda.36
Not surprisingly, Hitler abused his power over the few key minis-
tries held by his party by arresting and intimidating opponents before
calling for new elections. 37 Despite rampant intimidation of other
parties and their candidates by the now unchecked Nazi storm troop-
ers, the elections of March 1933 still did not yield an absolute majority
for the Nazis." But Hitler's position was now strong enough to pressure
Reichstag deputies to vote for the "Ermchtigungsgesetz," temporarily
suspending most aspects of constitutional rule and permitting govern-
ment legislation by decree. 39 By vesting near absolute authority in the
government, the Ermeichtigungsgesetz effectively nullified the principle of
separation of powers. A dictatorship, in the eyes of most contemporar-
ies, had been legalized. Although it is possible to raise technical
objections to the constitutional validity of the Ermi'chtigungsgesetz,40 the
requisite two-thirds majority of deputies in the First Chamber had
clearly consented to its passage.
41
A totalitarian regime thus came to power in Germany without
clearly violating the strictures of a democratic constitution.42 The
demise of the Republic suggests that threats to liberal regimes may
arise not only, as in Algeria, when a single radical party wins or
threatens to win an absolute majority of seats in parliament, but also
in a variety of circumstances when democrats become demoralized 43 or
are caught between competing extremist forces. 4 But apart from this
36. Details may be found in VII DOKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE
1052-1265 (E.R. Huber ed. 1984).
37. NICHOLIS, supra note 33, at 138-39.
38. Id. at 139-40.
39. Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich, RGBI. I 141 (1933), reprinted in Huber,
supra note 35, at 665 (Doc. No. 532).
40. Hans Schneider, Das Erm'chtigungsgesetz yom 24 M'rz 1933, in VON WEIMAR zu HITLER
1930-1933 405, 430 (Gotthard Jasper ed., 1968). It is disputed whether the unconstitutional
arrest of the 81 deputies of the Communist Party on February 28, 1933-an attempt to prevent
them from taking part in the vote-affected the constitutional validity of the Ermi'chtigungsgesetz,
since the required two-thirds of the members of the Reichstag were present for the vote. Id. at
428.
41. See Ernst Friesenhahn, Zur Legitimation und zum Scheitern der Weimarer Reichsverfassung, in
WEIMAR, SELBSTPREISGABE EINER DEMOKRATIE 91, 94 (K.D. Erdmann & H. Schulze eds.,
1980).
42. At the time, Germany was not the only country facing a threat from totalitarian parties.
Throughout the inter-war years, Fascist and other far-right political parties competed in elections
in European states, a number of which attempted to ban or restrict their activities. Karl
Loewenstein, Militant Democray and Fundamental Rights, 31 Am. POL. Sc. REv. 417, 420-24
(1937).
43. Friesenhahn, supra note 41, at 108.
44. KURT SONTHEIMER, ANTIDEMOKRATISCHES DENKEN IN DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK 391-
400 (1962).
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rather general conclusion, several more specific lessons have been drawn
from the Weimar and other similar experiences.
First, once an anti-democratic party obtains the means to exert
pressure on democratic parties to cede power "voluntarily," democratic
government may be beyond salvation. Democratic parties, in essence,
become the unfair victims of a process dedicated to fairness-a process
they themselves seek to preserve until the end. Second, there may be
no fool-proof way of determining whether a party will turn a democ-
racy into a dictatorship. For example, in a widely noted statement,
Hitler swore under oath in court that he would seek and exercise power
only by constitutional means.4 5 Moreover, the Ermiichtigungsgesetz ex-
plicitly provided that elections would be held after the expiration of
the current electoral period. On paper, at least, the events of 1933 did
not put an end to democracy in Germany. Third, if precautionary
measures are to be taken, they must be instituted before a radical party
has become so strong and well-organized that its prohibition would
result in civil war. With Nazi storm troopers and their Communist
counterparts already engaging in regular street brawls, this certainly
would have been the case in Germany after the first set of elections in
1932.46
The downfall of the Weimar Republic is also significant as the
historical period foremost on the minds of the U.N. delegates who
drafted the post-war human rights instruments.4 7 In crafting the Uni-
versal Declaration and later the Political Covenant, the drafters saw in
Weimar Germany several crucial "mistakes" to be avoided in the social
blueprints they were creating. The centrality of this historical episode
to contemporary human rights law will become evident when we
discuss the international community's response to anti-democratic par-
ties in the post-war era.48
45. In September 1930 Hitler was called to testify at the trial of three army officers accused
of high treason for infiltrating the army with Nazi propaganda. He stated:
The national-socialist movement will try to attain its aims in this state by constitutional
means. The constitution only prescribes the methods but not the goal. We will try to obtain
the necessary majorities in the legislative bodies by constitutional means in order to mould
the state, once we have succeeded, into the form which conforms to our ideas.
HERBERT MICHAELIS, URSACHEN UND FoLGEN-Vom DEUTSCHEN ZUSAMMENBRUCH 1918
UND 1945 aIS ZUR STAATLICHEN NEUORDNUNG DEUTSCHLANDS IN DER GEGENWART 532
(1962). As to Hitler's "legality tactics" generally, see KARL DImICH BRACHBE, DIE AUFL6SUNG
DER WEIMARER REPUB11K 110-15 (5th ed. 1971).
46. The Nazis and Communists were only two of several parties openly hostile to the Weimar
constitution. A successful ban of any one of the parties would not necessarily have saved the
Republic. See ROBERT Moss, THE COLLAPSE OF DEFOCRACY 182 (1977).
47. Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in HuimA RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 122
(Theodor Meron ed., 1984); MOSES MOSKOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH HUMAN
RIGHTS 8 (1974).
48. See discussion infra parts V.A & V.B.
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Some lawyers may derive a different lesson from the Weimar tragedy.
While the experience may have inspired legal innovation at the United
Nations, one might well ask whether a ban on the Nazi party-pur-
suant either to national or international law-would have made any
difference. Weimar Germany dissolved due to a longstanding and
complex political crisis that gave rise to Nazism as a symptom rather
than a cause of the Republic's dissolution. Thus lawyers may come to
think that bans on authoritarian parties are not only fraught with the
many dangers noted above; such bans may simply miss the point. By
and large, states in which extremist parties achieve broad appeal have
weak economies, ineffectual social institutions and a governmental
system facing a legitimacy crisis, 49 as clearly illustrated by the Algerian
experience. 50
It seems that the most fruitful course of action for such regimes
would be to address these underlying social ills, thereby demonstrating
to their citizens that resort to extremism is unnecessary to achieve real
social change.' 1 It might be argued that if international law allowed
banning extremist parties, it would provide the illusion of an easy
answer to social problems of complex origin, encouraging governments
to ignore the need for real reform.
But, in many cases, extremists have sufficient strength to present an
actual threat of assuming power and prevent the incumbent govern-
ment from regaining popular support by enacting fundamental reform.
The government's choices are narrowed either to removing the extrem-
ists from the political process or gambling on their threat being
overstated and allowing them to stand for election. In these cases,
removal may become a legitimate policy choice.
Whether such a decision comports with minimum legal standards
is a question ceded to the international community by relevant human
rights norms. States weighing a decision whether or not to institute a
ban are entitled to seek guidance from international law on this sub-
ject. The danger that a norm permitting bans may be misinterpreted
or misused does not seem a persuasive argument against endeavors
seeking to explain and clarify the norm. The norm needs to be clarified
in order to ensure that regimes facing antidemocratic opponents can
make decisions with the knowledge that they are acting in compliance
with international law.
49. Many scholars now see such conditions present in secular Arab societies. See, e.g., Muham-
mad Muslih & Augustus Richard Norton, The Need for Arab Democracy, FOR. POL., Summer 1991,
at 3.
50. John P. Entelis, State and Society in Transition, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN ALGERIA I (John
P. Entelis & Phillip C. Naylor eds., 1992).
51. For an argument that this should have been the course pursued in Algeria, see Robin
Wright, Islam, Democracy and the West, FOR. AFF., Summer 1992, at 131.
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III. THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIC TOLERANCE
The rise of totalitarian movements after World War I spurred many
democratic theorists to address the basic question here at issue: whether
or not to tolerate anti-democratic ideologies. This problem is perhaps
the central paradox of democratic regimes. 52 Democratic theory em-
braces diversity of public opinion as a fact of political life and holds
that society is best served by allowing equal competition among the
various factions. This ethic of tolerance makes possible all the other
characteristics associated with democratic systems-e.g., freedom of
political opinion, the notion of a loyal opposition, peaceful transitions
of power-and so becomes the primary claim to legitimacy of demo-
cratic systems." 3 The presence of anti-democratic ideologies thus pre-
sents a dilemma: to suppress such movements infringes upon democ-
racy's bedrock principle, but to allow them endangers the survival of
the very system institutionalizing the principle of tolerance. On this
fundamental question democratic theory has broken into two broad
camps.
A. Procedural Democracy
The first model defines democracy as a set of procedures. In Joseph
Schumpeter's classic formulation, democracy is the "institutional ar-
rangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals ac-
quire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people's vote."54 This sort of democracy provides a framework for
decision-making but does not prescribe the decisions themselves. Its
formal character derives from its Enlightenment roots as a reaction
against societies based on religious orthodoxy and the authority of a
single moral order. In their place, theorists of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries invoked "the figure of reasoning man who might
achieve total knowledge, total autonomy, and total power; whose use
of reason would enable him to see himself, not God, as the origin of
language, the maker of history, and the source of meaning in the
world." A legitimate political society embodied the triumph of such
rational discourse among citizens on a national scale.
52. See generally BENJAMIN E. LIPPINcoTr, DEMocRAcY'S DILEMMA: THE TOTALITARIAN
PARTY IN A FREE SOcIETY (1965).
53. SeeJoHN STUART MIU, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1919 ed.)
(1861); see generally DAVID Aj. RiCHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986), espe-
cially at 133-36.
54. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SocIAusM AND DEMOcRAcY 269 (2d ed. 1947).
55. Kate Manzo, Modernist Discourse and the Crisis of Development Theory, 26 STUD. IN COMP.
INT'L DE. 3, 7 (1991).
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According to the procedural view, because an individual's capacity
to reason was sufficient to "enable movement along the path of political
enlightenment and progress,"56 there was little need for government
to protect citizens from the influence of anti-rationalist ideas. When
rational citizens agree to create a political society, they do not delegate
to their government the power to select among the various points of
view present in their midst. In giving up its claim to truth, the modern
secular political order takes no position when a plurality of truths is
asserted. 7 Citizens are encouraged to assert their individual prefer-
ences, each of which is presumed to have equal moral worth and equal
entitlement to an airing.5 8 Therefore, the only way to constitute legiti-
mate authority is through a procedural mechanism giving effect to each
individual view, i.e., majority rule. Consensus decision-making would
be preferable, but impractical in the modern state as even early repub-
lics recognized.
The procedural model acknowledges that for many citizens such an
enforced heterogeneity can become disconcerting. Central organizing
truths provide a sense of comfort that a constitutional "agreement to
disagree" cannot.5 9 In any pluralistic society, therefore, certain groups
will continue to agitate for a return to orthodoxy of one form or
another, whether political, ethnic, religious, or based on a cult of
personality. In order to combat this tendency and remain vital, the
procedural view holds that a democratic system must subject itself to
continued self-criticism through exploring the value of tolerance.60
Electoral politics, in the procedural view, is the primary vehicle for this
self-examination to occur. The enemies of democracy will be among
the likely participants.
By opening the electoral process to its critics, democracy necessarily
retains the possibility of failure. This is implicit even in the cherished
central image of democratic theory-the social contract-which sug-
gests that pluralistic systems are not somehow ordained a priori, but
rather arise from a decision of the people. If a popular majority may
create a democratic system, it would seem to follow that it should also
56. Id.
57. Of course, this begs the question of whether the ethic of tolerance is itself an asserted
truth. Democratic states have certainly acted as if this were the case. Few such states take the
position that their ideology is no better or worse than any other. See W.J. STANKIWICZ,
APPROACHES TO DEN.iRAcy 100 (1980).
58. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMiOCRACY AND ITS CRITics 108 (1989).
59. Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 428.
60. As Thomas Emerson writes: "Even if we consider freedom of expression an absolute value
... nevertheless it is important that it remain open to challenge. Otherwise it becomes a 'dead
dogma,' ill-understood, lacking in vitality, and vulnerable to erosion or full-scale attack" THoMAs
I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEi OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN 51 (1971).
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have the power to disband it. 6 ' The process itself cannot guarantee that
supporters of democracy will always emerge victorious; that is a ques-
tion of political wil. 62 The procedural view therefore recognizes that
formal political structures have limited capabilities in moments of
crisis, holds nonetheless that the political will of committed democrats
can be strengthened if the alternatives to democracy are understood
and debated.
B. Substantive Democracy
The second view of democracy is substantive, defining democracy
not as the process of ascertaining the preferences of political majorities,
but as a society in which majority rule is made meaningful.63 The
substantive view begins from the proposition that majorities are fluid.
In order for citizens to move in and out of the majority as issues
change, they must at all times enjoy a core of political rights that
ensures effective participation. In this view, democratic procedure is
not an end in itself but a means of creating a society in which citizens
enjoy certain essential rights, primary among them the right to vote
for their leaders.
None of these rights, however, is absolute in the sense that it may
be used to abolish the right itself or other basic rights. Thus, an
authoritarian party does not achieve legitimacy simply because it en-
joys support among the electorate at a given moment. In this respect
the principles of justice undergirding a democratic society are, in the
substantive view, somewhat deceptive. By their nature they are per-
missive, encouraging individual dissent, but those principles cannot be
understood as permitting their own alienation. 64 Otherwise they would
become meaningless: the principles would describe as fundamental a
social condition that no longer exists once a totalitarian party takes
power. John Stuart Mill argues that society can no more alienate its
collective liberty than an individual can sell himself into slavery:
61. See HANS KEISEN, VOM WESEN UND WERT DER DEMOKRATIE 94, 98, 102-03 (2d ed.
1929); EMERSON, supra note 60, at 49-50.
62. See CARL COHEN, DEMOCRACY 202 (1971); Ernst Wolfgang Btickenfdrde, Demokratk als
Verfassungsprinzip, in HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPuBUIK DEUTSCHLAND 1,
912-14 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987).
63. Ralph Gilbert Ross, Democracy, Party and Politics, 64 ETHICS 100, 120-21 (1953).
64. This argument is commonly phrased as saying that freedom can permit skepticism about
all viewpoints save the value of freedom itself. As Carl Auerbach writes:
[I]f the theory that there are no political orthodoxies is taken to mean that we must also
be skeptical about the value of freedom and therefore tolerate freedom's enemies, it will tend
to produce, in practice, the very absolutism it was designed to avoid-as experience with
modern totalitarianism demonstrates.
Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free
Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 173, 188 (1956).
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[B~y selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes
any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats,
in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of
allowing him to dispose of himself .... The principle of freedom
cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not
freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom.65
One cannot, it is argued, simultaneously postulate tolerance as the
fundamental organizing principle of government and accept the possi-
bility that a group preaching mass intolerance may one day gain control
of that government.
The substantive view of democracy finds support among theorists
from a variety of philosophic traditions-we highlight two.
1. John Rawls: The Remedial Power of Reasoned Debate
In the Anglo-American world the strongest current of the substan-
tive model requires that any valid theory of social organization be
grounded in notions of justice. Achieving the condition of justice must
be the theory's ultimate end. A legitimate political process must always
act in service of creating that condition; in this sense it is result-ori-
ented. In contrast to the procedural approach, the substantive view
does not regard tolerance as the transcendent norm of a democratic
society. Tolerance is important for facilitating the enjoyment of liberty
and equality, the essential components of a just political order. How-
ever, when tolerance acts to negate those conditions its value must be
reconsidered.66
John Rawls, perhaps the most influential contemporary theorist of
democratic society, adheres to a version of the substantive view. For
Rawls, the principles of liberty selected in his hypothetical "original
position" carry their own imperative; they are "not derived from prac-
tical necessities or reasons of state,"67 and can only be "justified when
it is necessary for liberty itself, to prevent an invasion of freedom that
would be still worse."68
Under such a framework Rawls examines the problem of "toleration
of the intolerant." He asks two central questions. First, does an intol-
erant group "[have] any title to complain if it is not tolerated"? Rawls
answers no: "[al person's right to complain is limited to violations of
principles he acknowledges himself."69 Rawls' position can be restated
65. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 236 (World Publishing Co. 1962) (1859).
66. John Locke gave early expression to this view in his writings on religious tolerance. JOHN
LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 14-18, 51 (2d ed. Bobbs-Merrill 1955) (1689).
67. JOHN RAwis, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE 214 (1971).
68. Id. at 215.
69. Id. at 217.
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in terms more directly relevant to our problem: if a party announces
its intention to suppress minorities once it attains power, claiming
justification in an electoral mandate, then that party may be subject
to suppression while it is itself in the minority. As Rawls says, this is
a principle that both sides accept.
Second, Rawls asks under what conditions a tolerant group has the
right not to tolerate those who are intolerant. Rawls answers that
intolerance is permissible only where there are "some considerable risks
to our own legitimate interests."7 0 Short of such a dire threat, tolerant
citizens must have faith in the remedial powers of their democratic
institutions:
[Ihe natural strength of free institutions must not be forgotten
.... Knowing the inherent stability of a just constitution, mem-
bers of a well-ordered society have the confidence to limit the
freedom of the intolerant only in the special cases when it is
necessary for preserving equal liberty itself.7'
Rawls is willing to invest much time and faith in this "psychological
principle" on the assumption that in most cases an intolerant group
whose liberties are protected "will tend to lose its intolerance and
accept liberty of conscience." 72 Should such tolerant proceduralism fail,
Rawls countenances repressive measures against the intolerant not as a
suspension of principle but an application of principles of justice agreed
to even by the intolerant in the original position. "What is essential is
that when persons with different convictions make conflicting demands
on the basic structure as a matter of political principle, they are to
judge these claims by the principles of justice. '73 Thus, despite the
denial of liberty to a group of citizens, the fundamental organizing
principles of justice according to Rawls are, in the end, well-served.
2. Carl Schmitt: The Theory of the "Unalterable Core"
In continental Europe, the most influential theoretical critique of a
purely procedural understanding of democracy comes from Carl Schmitt.
Drawing on writings of the French constitutional theorist Maurice
Hauriou,74 Schmitt suggests an alternative to the procedural positivism
and relativism which prevailed in Germany during the Weimar era.7 5
70. Id. at 219.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 221.
74. See MAURICE HAURiOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONELLE 297 (1923).
75. See HL ,.UT S EINBERGER, KONZEPTION UND GRENZEN FREIHEITLICHER DEMIOKKArIS
208-09 (1974).
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In his famous 1932 article "Legalitit und Legitimitit" ("Legality and
Legitimacy"),76 Schmitt made a distinction between the procedural
rules in a constitution and its substantive principles. Schmitt claims
that the basic substantive principles such as the democratic character
of the state were the result of a fundamental decision of the "pouvoir
constituant" (the people) and therefore could not be simply swept aside
by the "pouvoir constitu" (the elected representatives), even if the
procedures for a constitutional amendment were followed.77
Schmitt's theory was not wholly new. Since 1884 the French consti-
tution had provided that the republican form of government could not
be changed even by constitutional amendment.7 8 Schmitt, however,
asserted that a democratic constitution contains an implicit core of
unalterable rules which embody its identity. Because procedural rules
could not function to abolish the essence of that which they were
designed to effectuate, they contain implied limitations. Consequently,
in 1933, he interpreted Hitler's rise to power not as a legal appoint-
ment under the Weimar constitution but as a successfiil revolution.79
The idea of constitutions containing an unalterable core received
widespread support after the Second World War. Article 79(3) of the
German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) explicitly provides that the articles
guaranteeing the dignity of man and the basic principles of govern-
ment (democracy, rule of law, separation of powers, federalism, social
state) cannot be changed by constitutional amendment. Its framers
reasoned that if such a clause had been present in the Weimar consti-
tution, Hitler would have been forced to violate the constitution
openly before assuming virtually dictatorial power.8 0 They concluded
that given the traditional orderly and legalistic sentiment of the Ger-
man people, this might have made a difference. 8 1
The idea of the unalterable core also serves the function of legiti-
mizing the establishment of legal institutions designed to prevent a
democratic constitution from being turned against itself. Thus, Schmitt's
views find expression in those provisions of the Grundgesetz setting out
76. See Carl Schmitt, Legalitit und Legitimt' reprinted in CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSRECHT-
LICHE AuFsXTzE 263 (1958).
77. See id. at 311; see also CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 102-12 (1928); CARL SCHMITT,
DER HOTER DER VERFASSUNG 16 (1931).
78. LA CONSTITUTION DE LA FRANCE (of Feb. 25, 1875) art. 8(3), reprinted in LES CONSTITU-
nONS DE LA FRANCE 308 (L. Duguir et al. eds., 1952). For discussion of the legal force of this
rule, see HAURIOU, supra note 74, at 366-67 (1923), and IV LtaON DUGUIT, TRAIT- DE DROIT
CONSTITUtIONNEL 538-41 (1924).
79. Carl Schmitt, Das Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich, 38 DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-
ZEITUNG 455-58 (1933); CARL SCHMITT, DAs REICHSSTATrHALTERGESMEZ 9 (1933).
80. PARLAMENTARISCHER RAT, GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBUK DEUTSCHLAND
(ENTWORFu), Formulierungen der Fachausschiisse des Allgemeinen Redaktionsausschusses, des
Hauptausschusses und des Plenums 102 (1948/49).
81. Friesenhahn, supra note 41, at 95.
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a procedure for banning anti-democratic parties (art. 21), for stripping
extremist individuals of certain civil rights (art. 18), and giving every
citizen, when no other means are available, the right of resistance
against attempts to overturn the constitutional order (art. 20 (4)).82
Schmitt's theory is not limited to democratic constitutions, however,
and should therefore be regarded as morally relative,8 3 as born out by
Schmitt's own life. Although he served as a counsel to President
Hindenburg until 1932 and supported his efforts to preserve the
democratic constitution against totalitarian movements,'1 Schmitt be-
came the best-known legal defender of the Nazi regime once Hitler
assumed power.8 5 While this switch cost Schmitt his position as a
university teacher after the Second World War,8 6 the validity of his
theory of the unalterable core and his parentage of article 79(3) of the
German Basic Law is widely, although sometimes not explicitly, rec-
ognized.87
Carl Schmitt was not the only advocate in Germany (or elsewhere)
during the inter-war era of a more substantive or militant under-
standing of democracy.88 However, he was doubtless the best-known
representative of those who claimed that democracy rests on a value-
choice which does not require, or even permit, a procedure of self-abo-
lition.
C. Democratic Theory and International Norms
What is the value of these two theoretical models to an under-
standing of international law? Theoretical conceptions of democracy do
not possess normative value as such; and in particular, as models of
domestic constitutionalism, they have no necessary international nor-
mative value. However, discussions of democratic theory do not take
place in a political or normative vacuum. Often, by drawing upon ideas
expressed in nascent legal rules and political institutions, theoretical
discussions serve to crystallize a new conception of democracy arising
82. Id. at 92.
83. STEINBERGER, supra note 75, at 191.
84. J.W. BENDERSKY, CARL ScHmiTT THEoIusT FOR THE REICH 172-91 (1983).
85. See id. at 195-218; PAUL HIRST, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS LIITS 128-37
(1990); David Aj. Richards, Comparative Revolutionary Constitutionalism: A Research Agenda for
Comparative Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INTL' L. & POL. 1, 53-59 (1993).
86. BENDERSKY, supra note 84, at 274.
87. See MAUNZ-DORIG, GRUNDGESETz KOMMENTAR, art. 79 nos. 21-25 (1963); FRIEDRICH
KARL FROMME, VON DER WEIMARER VERFASSUNG ZUM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 179-80 (1960);
Friesenhahn, supra note 41, at 92; BENDERSKY, supra note 84, at 283-84.
88. See, eg., Karl Loewenstein, Comment, in VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLE-
HRER, Heft 7, 193 (1932); GERHARD LEIBHOLZ, DIE AUFL6SUNG DER LIBERALEN DEMOKRATIE
IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DAS AUTORIT'ARE STAATEILD 9-20 (1933); Loewenstein, supra note 42
at 417-32 & 638-58.
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in a state. The discussion among constitutionalists in Weimar Ger-
many-with its main protagonists Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt-
was closely followed by an interested public and profoundly influenced
popular opinion on the subject.89 In this sense theoretical discussions
often reflect the very practical need of democratic societies to reassess
and redefine their identities in times of crisis. In so doing, they
generate a practice to which the international lawyer may turn for
normative guidance.
In addition, theoretical debate also aids the pedagogical task of
meaningful classification. The range of possible responses to the prob-
lem of democratic intolerance is necessarily limited, even taking into
account the many differences among the world's democratic societies.
Any thorough discussion of the issue, therefore, will inevitably revert
to the level of abstraction represented by the substantive and proce-
dural models, and eventually to those models themselves. This will
become apparent in the next section where we use these two models
of democracy as a framework to classify and analyze state practice.
IV THE PRACTICE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRATIC
STATES
The focus of this discussion concerning whether anti-democratic
actors (political parties, other groups, or individuals) may be excluded
from the political process presupposes that the process is otherwise
democratic. Accordingly, in examining state practice on this question
we will survey only states with "stable" democratic systems.98 Such a
methodological approach necessarily implies a certain bias in favor of
the western democratic tradition, given the origin of modern demo-
cratic systems in the West. However, in order to ground any universal
or quasi-universal norm in a cross-section of international practice and
opinion, we will also include discussions of several developing countries
with long-standing democratic traditions. The practice of states with
no meaningful democratic tradition is simply not helpful in answering
the question of who may be excluded from a political process that is
otherwise democratic.
89. SONTHEIMER, supra note 44, at 82-84, 94-98, 105-12.
90. The determination of whether a state has a "stable" democratic system is both relative and
subjective. Yet, in states where genuine elections are in fact the norm-a norm presumably
preserved by the exclusion of certain political actors-a majoritarian political process must have
become embedded in the political culture. Stable stares have made real the political model
envisioned by human rights treaties. Because each stable state was at some point a nascent or
endangered democracy itself, its legislation and practice with regard to anti-democratic actors
reflects its sense of when such actors can appropriately be excluded and is relevant to our model
for the international level.
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We have classified the states examined according to the substantive
and procedural models of democracy outlined in Part III. This theo-
retical typology is only a rough abstraction of actual state practice. In
an attempt to bring the classification closer to meaningful ideal types,
we have further subdivided these two broad categories into "tolerant"
(passive) and "militant" (active) categories. These designations allow us
to take account not only of a state's formal constitutional framework
but also of how its norms regarding anti-democratic actors have been
interpreted and implemented over time. Thus, we divide state practice
into the following four categories: (1) tolerant procedural democracy;
(2) militant procedural democracy; (3) tolerant substantive democracy;
and (4) militant substantive democracy.
A. Tolerant Procedural Democracy in the United Kingdom, Botswana, and
Japan
The United Kingdom, Botswana, and Japan provide examples of a
tolerant procedural model of democracy.
1. Procedural Democracy in the United Kingdom
The unwritten British constitution rests on the concept of the
sovereignty of Parliament. 9' Traditionally, the British legislature is not
bound by any substantive rules and every act of Parliament is valid if
enacted according to the proper procedures. 92 Such legislative suprem-
acy is a formidable obstacle to introducing an anti-majoritarian bill of
rights into British law. While an absolutist view of the sovereignty of
Parliament is increasingly questioned today, "short of an extreme situ-
ation," it is still "very unlikely that the courts would of their volition
begin to exercise power derived solely from common law to review the
validity of Acts of Parliament."93 Therefore, the United Kingdom still
appears to adhere to a purely procedural model of democracy.
This lack of written substantive principles, on the other hand, grants
the British government substantial latitude in confronting anti-demo-
cratic actors. In practice, though, the British Parliament has only
enacted laws empowering the government to dissolve certain groups-
including political parties-if they pose a threat of violent behavior.
Section 2(1)(b) of the Public Order Act of 1936,94 for example, crimi-
nalizes membership in any association "organised and trained or organ-
91. J. ALDER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 63-67, (1989); See Manuel v.
Attorney-General [1983] 1 Ch. 77, 89 (appeal taken from Canada).
92, E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CoNsnuTIoNAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 68-81
(11th ed. 1993).
93. Id. at 75.
94. Public Order Act, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6, § 2 (1936) (Eng.).
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ised and equipped either for the purpose of enabling them to be
employed for the use or display of physical force in promoting any
political object." And according to Section 28(2) of the Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1991,95 the Secretary of State
may proscribe "any organisation that appears to him to be concerned
in terrorism or in promoting or encouraging it.''96
In the scheme of possible restrictions on political actors, these pro-
visions are fairly benign.97 Not only do they require that the groups
engage in or support actual physical violence, but the application of
these laws has also been measured and restrained. Although the British
government would clearly have had the power to dissolve Sinn Fein-a
party which openly sides with the still outlawed Irish Republican
Army-it has refrained from doing so.98 The British system thus
embodies the tolerant view that it is less dangerous to allow anti-demo-
cratic actors unfettered access to the electoral system than it is to
suppress them and in so doing create martyrs. The threat that such
actors pose is perhaps minimized by the fact that Britain's "first past
the post" electoral system, based on single member electoral districts,
acts as an efficient barrier to extremist parties becoming serious con-
tenders for political power.
2. Procedural Democracy in Botswana
Like the United Kingdom, the Republic of Botswana has main-
tained a democratic system which has remained officially tolerant with
respect to anti-democratic actors since its independence in 1966. Bot-
swana's constitutional provisions on freedom of expression and associa-
tion provide that those rights may be restricted if "reasonably justifiable
in a democratic society."99 These clauses have not, however, been invoked
to suppress anti-democratic parties. 100 The remarkable atmosphere of
relative cooperation and mutual trust that has marked Botswanan
politics is no doubt responsible for the absence of extremist groups and
any laws designed to restrict them.10 1 The procedural character of
95. Northern Ireland Act (Emergency Provisions Act), 1991, ch. 24 (Eng.).
96. Id A number of organizations are already proscribed by the Act. See § 28(2) and sched.
2. Id These rules were first embodied in the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act.
97. Compare the legal restrictions in Britain with the more militant restrictions described
infra part IV.D.
98. Gordon Smith, Die Institution der politischen Partei in Grofbritannien, in PARTEiNRECHT IM
EUROPXISCHEN VERGLEICH 304, 329 (Dimitris Tsatsos et al. eds., 1990).
99. BOTs. CONST. ch. II, §§ 12 & 13.
100. See John D. Holm, Botswana: One African Success Story, 93 CURRENT HIST. 198, 200-01
(1994); DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA 167 (John Holm & Patrick Molutsi eds., 1989); NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEMOCRACIES IN REGIONS OF CRIsIs:
BOTSWANA, COSTA RICA, ISRAEL 89-120 (1990).
101. See NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 100,
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Botswanan democracy is further evidenced by a lack of restrictions on
the scope of constitutional amendments. 10 2
3. Procedural Democracy in Japan'0 3
The procedural character of the Japanese system is seen by examin-
ing two clauses of the Japanese constitution that could conceivably
justify party restrictions. The first provides that the people "shall
refrain from any abuse" of constitutional freedoms and rights. 1 4 The
second, which renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation, 10 5 has
been interpreted as "excluding antidemocratic militarism from national
politics and governmental power."'16 Most Japanese constitutional
scholars, however, agree that the lack of a clause explicitly permitting
restrictions and the presence of a guarantee of freedom of association
would likely render legislation authorizing a ban on a party unconsti-
tutional.10 7 In addition, the Japanese Political Finance Control Law
does not contain a procedure for excluding political parties from par-
ticipating in the electoral process.' 08 Despite constitutional provisions
to the contrary, the Japanese system operates as a procedural democracy.
B. Militant Procedural Democracy in the United States
Like the United Kingdom, Botswana, and Japan, the United States
practices a procedural form of democracy. One clear line of demarcation
between "militant" and "tolerant" systems is whether the national
constitution can be amended to alter or eliminate democratic institu-
tions. As we will see, a number of constitutions contain seemingly
paradoxical clauses which provide that certain basic structures can not
be altered, even by amendment. In the United States, however, no rule
precludes the remote possibility of amending the Constitution to abol-
ish a republican form of government. 1°9 In The Federalist, Alexander
Hamilton declared that it is a "fundamental principle of republican
at 109; Jack Parson, Republic of Botswana, in 1 WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS
AND PARTIES 116-18 (George E. Delury ed., 2d ed. 1987) thereinafter WORLD ENCYCLOPEoIA];
James J. Zaffiro, The Press and Political Opposition in an African Democracy: the Case of Botswana, 27
J. COMMONWEALTH & CONIP. POL. 51-73 (1989).
102. BOTS. CONST. ch. V, pt. IV, § 89.
103. We would like to thank Akiho Shibata, senior fellow of the Center for International
Studies at New York University Law School, for his assistance in providing information for this
section.
104. KENPO [Constitution] ch. III, art. 12 (Japan).
105. Id. ch. II, § 9.
106. Lawrence W. Beer, Constitutionalism and Rights in Japan and Korea, in CONSTITUTONALISM
AND RIGHTS 225, 235 (louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
107. Koji SATO, THE CONSTITUTION 96-97 (1981).
108. Martin E. Weinstein, Japan, in 1 WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 101, at 608.
109. Two areas of the United States Constitution are unamendable, though neither preserves
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government" to allow "the people to alter or abolish the established
Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happi-
ness."
1 0
Yet despite a professed commitment to an open political process,
often regarded as the primary justification for judicial review,"' the
United States has enacted qualitatively more restrictive anti-subversion
legislation than has the United Kingdom. Three major statutes, all
products of hot and cold wars, were clearly designed to frustrate the
activities of allegedly subversive parties. 11 2 The Smith Act of 1940
parallels British legislation by criminalizing membership in groups
dedicated to overthrowing the United States government by force." 3
Ten years later, the Internal Security Act of 1950 abandoned the
requirement of a showing of an actual or imminent threat to the
democratic system by establishing a registration system for parties
designated as "subversive" by the Subversive Activities Control Board." 4
And finally, the Communist Control Act of 1954 divested the Com-
munist Party of the United States (CPUSA), and any of its successors,
of all rights and privileges under state and federal law.115 Although
these statutes have not been invalidated, there have been no reported
prosecutions since the early 1960s.116
Since the United States Constitution does not explicitly guarantee
freedom of association, these statutes have been challenged under the
First Amendment as violations of free speech. In reviewing convictions
representative government in toto. Article V prohibits amendments that concern certain slavery
issues and the equality of state representation in Senate. U.S. CONST. art V. Article IV, section 4
of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government," addresses only the federal government's obliga-
tion to states, but not its obligation to itself or the alteration of that obligation by amendment.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Moreover, any claim that the guarantee clause does make the form of
state government immutable would almost certainly be dismissed by the federal courts as a
non-justiciable political question. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). For a discussion of the possible implied limitations
on the amending power, especially where the Bill of Rights is concerned, see JOHN R. VILE,
CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 127-46
(1993).
110. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
111. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST 106 (1980).
112. The Espionage Act of 1917 was used to prosecute Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist Party
candidate for President in 1920. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). The Debs case
and other prosecutions under the Espionage Act, however, were limited by the terms of the statute
to times of war. See Espionage Act, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Star. 217, 219 (1917), codified as 18 U.S.C.
2388 (1988).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982).
114. 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-835 (1991).
115. 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-844 (1991).
116. See, ag., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Communist Party of United States
v. United States, 384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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under these statutes, the United States Supreme Court has generally
distinguished protected speech about anti-democratic activity from
unprotected incitement to action against democratic institutions.'17 In
early cases involving the CPUSA, the Court declined to consider
whether the Party was by its nature dedicated to overthrowing the
government. Instead, the Court chose to take judicial notice of the
Party's goals'1 8 or to give deference to congressional findings.'1 9 Later,
the Court began to require specific evidence that individual defendants
were active members of the CPUSA and had knowledge of its illegal
activity.120
Nevertheless, the Court has consistently upheld the core of these
statutes as legitimate acts of preemptive self-defense by a democratic
society121 under an evolving standard. 122 This judicial confirmation of
anti-subversive legislation makes it possible to speak of the United
States as a militant procedural democracy, although it has become
progressively less so since the 1950s. In its more recent jurisprudence,
the Court has heightened its scrutiny, returning to its original "clear
and present danger" standard. For example, the Court has held that
advocacy becomes unlawful incitement only "where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawlessness and is likely
to incite or produce such action."'123 This significantly enhanced stand-
ard of proof has made successful prosecutions extremely difficult. 124
117. See AURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 841 (2d ed. 1988).
118. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1950).
119. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S.
1, 93-94 (1960). Congress had declared that "a world Communist movement" existed, whose
goal was "to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the
world" and that in the United States members of the Communist Party "in effect transfer their
allegiance to the foreign country in which is vested the direction and control of the world
Communist movement." 50 U.S.C. §§ 781(1) & (9) (1991). But see Dennis, 341 U.S. at 588
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
120. Robel, 389 U.S. at 262 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511 n.9
(1964); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
318-27 (1957).
121. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509.
122. The standard used early in the century to uphold convictions under the 1917 Espionage
Act was "clear and present danger," Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The
standard was later modified in Dennis to require the courts to "ask whether the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger." Dennis, 34 U.S. at 510.
123. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968).
124. The Supreme Court has reinforced the procedural nature of First Amendment theory by
striking down a "hate speech" ordinance as impermissible content regulation. R.AV. v. St. Paul,
112 S.Cr. 2538 (1992).
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C. Tolerant Substantive Democracy in France, Canada, and India
While the United States, Great Britain, Botswana, and Japan all
exemplify "procedural democracies," France, Canada, and India can be
characterized as tolerant substantive democracies.
1. Substantive Democracy in France
In contrast to the American system, the French constitution of 1958
explicitly provides that, "[t]he republican form of government shall
not be subject to amendment.' 12' A further substantive limit on tra-
ditional democratic principles appears in article 4 of the French con-
stitution. This article provides that all political parties must respect
the principles of national sovereignty and democracy.126 This principle
originated from concern over the threat posed by the French Commu-
nist party.127 At one point it was even suggested that the constitution
should explicitly allow the government, upon application to the Haute
Cour dejustice, to dissolve a political party which violated its constitu-
tional duties.'28 Although this proposal was ultimately defeated,
French constitutional law still seems to pose no obstacles to the ban-
ning of political parties on the basis of an act of parliament. Indeed,
according to article 34, only parliament, and not an independent
judiciary, can promulgate rules concerning a citizen's fundamental
rights.129
The evolution of the right of association in France, including the
right to form political parties, provides a good example of how civil
rights are protected. Like its United States counterpart, none of the
various French constitutions have explicitly guaranteed the right of
association. But unlike the United States, the French legislature pro-
claimed this right-and specifically defined its limitations-by statute
in 1901.13° Article 3 of this 1901 law states that any association which
"intends to infringe on the republican form of government is null and
void,"'131 as pronounced ex officio by a civil court. In practice, however,
a prohibition under the law of 1901 has never taken place, 132 in part
125. LA CONSTUTON DE LA FRANCE (of Oct. 4, 1958) title XIV, art. 89.
126. Id. art. 4 at 53. "Les partis et groupements politiques... doivent respecter les principes
de ]a souverainet6 nationale et de la d~mocratie."
127. 2 L'HISTOIE DE L'tLABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958 128-31
(1988).
128. 1 id. at 427.
129. 1 JEAN RivERo, LES LIBERTS PUBLIQUES 184 (6th ed. 1991).
130. Law of July 1, 1901 (J.O. July 2, 1901) 4025-27; see JACQUES ROBERT, LIBERT9S
PUBLICS ET DROITS DE L'HOMME 94, 584-604 (4th ed. 1988).
131. See id. at 588.
132. G.P. BOVENTER, GRENZEN POUTISCHER FREIHEIT IM DEMOKRATISCHEN STAAT 170
(1985).
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because the law applies only to officially registered associations and not
to more informal political groups. 133
The same is not true of a 1936 law that gives the President of the
Republic the power to dissolve groups that: (1) provoke armed dem-
onstrations, (2) are of a paramilitary nature, or (3) have as their goal
the dismemberment of the territorial state, the forceful overthrow of
the republican form of government, the instigation of racial or other
group discrimination, or the dissemination of propaganda promoting
such discrimination. 134 This rather imprecisely worded statute 35 has
frequently been invoked by French Presidents 136 against small groups
on the political fringe,137 even though it is clear that the law of 1936
could also be applied against major political parties. 138
The highest French administrative court, the Conseil d'Etat, is em-
powered to review the President's action.139 The court has interpreted
the 1936 law rather broadly.140 For instance, the court has held that a
group need not pose a threat of actual violent behavior to apply the
law if, for example, its platform or published views question the
integrity of the national territory. Accordingly, the Conseil d'Etat has
affirmed the dissolution of parties and groups based solely on their
secessionist goals. 141 Groups that merely express support for other
violent groups may also be prohibited. 142 The court has reversed only
two prohibition decisions--one for lack of good cause 143 and the other
because the government failed to meet its burden of proof.144
While there appears to be meaningful judicial review of party pro-
hibition orders under the 1901 and 1936 laws, the French parliament
retains the power to enact more restrictive legislation, subject to a
133. Id. at 164.
134. Law of Jan. 10, 1936 (J.O. Jan. 13, 1936, p.522) art. 1.
135. See Jean-Jacques Israel, Article 4 in FRANiOIs LUCHAIRE & GgRARD CONAC, LA CONSTI-
TUTION DE LA R9PUBLIQUE FRANIs E 218 (2d ed. 1987).
136. The Conseil d'Etat reviewed seventeen dissolution decisions between 1955 and 1984. See
[1955-1964] CONSEIL D'ETAT, TABLE D&CENNALE, [1965-1974] id., [1975-1984] id.
137. See Michel Fromont, Die Institution der politisechen Partei in Frankrech, in PARTEIENnUCHT
IM EUiOPISCHEN VERGLEICH, supra note 98 at 219.
138. See Israel, supra note 135, at 218.
139. See decisions cited in infra notes 139-143.
140. Id.
141. Judgment of Oct. 8, 1975 (Association Enbata), Conseil d'etat, Lebon 494 (Fr.) (affirming
the dissolution of Basque separatists); Judgment of Jan. 9, 1959 (Sieurs Hoang Xuan Man),
Conseil d'etat, Lebon 25 (Fr.) (dissolving group for propaganda hostile to French sovereignty over
Indochina); Judgment of July 15, 1964 (Dame Tapua et autres), Conseil d'etar, Lebon 407 (Fr.)
(dissolving political party in Tahiti seeking to found an independent Polynesian republic).
142. Judgment of Feb. 5, 1965 (Association Comit6 d'entente pour l'Alg6rie frangaise), Conseil
d'etar, Lebon 73 (Fr.).
143. Judgment of June 26, 1987 (Fdration d'action nationale et europ~ene), Conseil d'etat,
Lebon 235 (Fr.).
144. Judgment of July 21, 1970 (Sieurs Boussel, dit Lambert (Pierre), Dorey, Stobnicer, dit
Berg), Conseil d'etat, Lebon 504 (Fr.).
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challenge under a landmark 1971 decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel
requiring that no act of parliament infringe certain core civil rights
principles ("principes fondamentaux"). 145 The precise impact of the
1971 rule is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, because political parties
owe a constitutional duty to respect the principle of democracy (article
4), it appears that behavior threatening the democratic process would
not be protected by the Conseil Constitutionnel as an element of the right
of association.14
6
In short, French law contains several elements of a substantive theory
of democracy. A number of French scholars have questioned the legal
force of these elements, chiefly, articles 4 and 89 of the Constitution.
147
Evidently, a comparatively tolerant political culture since 1958 has
made the elaboration of a more militant form of democracy unneces-
sary.
2. Substantive Democracy in Canada
Canada can also be labeled a tolerant substantive democracy. In
1982, a new Charter on Rights and Freectoms for Canada came into
force by act of the British Parliament. Its provisions on the rights of
anti-democratic parties parallel, in many ways, the international legal
regime discussed in Part V infra.14 For example, while section 2 of
the Charter guarantees both freedom of expression and freedom of
association, section 1 provides that those rights are subject to "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society." In the Oakes case, the Canadian Supreme
Court scrutinized section 1 restrictions through a two-pronged test:
(1) the objective served must be of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a protected right or freedom; and (2) the means chosen must
be reasonable and demonstrably justified. 149
Section 1 has never been invoked to justify restrictions on political
parties, although prior to the enactment of the Charter, Canada had
145. Judgment ofJuly 16, 1971, Conseil Constitutionnel, 29 (Fr.); see RIvERo, snpra note 129,
at 187-88.
146. Jean-Paul Jaqu6, L'abus de Droits Fondamentaux et la Lutte contre los Ennemis de la Dbmocra-
tie-en Droit International et en Droit interne Franfais, in IUOUPOULOS-STRANGAS, DER MISSBRAUCH
VON GRUNDRECHTEN IN DER DEMOKRATIE 129, 137 (1989). This view seems to be confirmed
by a decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel holding that under article 4, political parties are granted
no privileges beyond the general right of association. RECUELL DES DECISIONS DU CONSEIL
CONSTITUTIONNEL 78 (1984). See also MARCEL PR9LOT & JEAN BOULOIS, INsTITUTIONS POu-
TIQUES ET DROrT CONSTTUnONNEL 669 (11th ed. 1990).
147. See eg., CHARLES DEBBASCH ET AL., DROsT CONSTITUTnONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS Poii-
TIQuEs 93 (3d ed. 1990); Jean-Louis Seurin, Article 4 in LucHAIRE & CONAC, supra note 134, at
213, 215-16.
148. See Regina v. Keegstra, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 230 (1990).
149. Regina v. Oakes, 19 C.R.R. 308, 311 (1986).
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placed severe restrictions on communist party activities and in 1970
it declared the Front de Liberation de Quebec an illegal organization.' 50
During the Charter era, the controversy most relevant to party restric-
tions has been an attempt to regulate so-called "hate speech." In 1990
the Canadian Supreme Court heard three cases challenging the consti-
tutionality of statutory provisions criminalizing speech which fosters
hatred against persons based on their group status.151 Following the
Oakes test, the Court first found an overriding societal interest in
combatting the sense of inequality fostered by hate speech, which, it
held "erod[es] the tolerance and open-mindedness that must flourish
in a multicultural society which is committed to the idea of equal-
ity."152 Second, the Court found the legislative restrictions both rea-
sonable and justifiable, primarily on the grounds that the hate speech
targeted was "only tenuously connected to the values underlying the
freedom of speech" and so its suppression engendered minimal cost to
Canadian democracy.153
The hate speech decisions seem to be clear precedent for the consti-
tutionality of self-protection legislation in Canada. The Supreme Court
has opted for a strongly substantive model of democracy, viewing free
speech as a contingent value which may, at certain crucial moments,
erode rather than enhance fundamental democratic principles. 154 Some
Canadian commentators have argued that suppressing anti-democratic
parties will only increase their allure. 55 Yet, this is a question of
tactics. Doctrinally, self-protection legislation in Canada appears to
have a firm constitutional footing.
3. Substantive Democracy in India
The Indian Supreme Court is granted the power of judicial review
under article 132(1) of the Indian Constitution, thereby enabling it to
protect the fundamental rights set out in articles 12-35. One of these
150. SeeJ. PATRICK BOYER, 1 ELECTION LAw IN CANADA 19-24 (1987); THOMAS R. BERGER,
FRAGILE FREEDOMS: HuMAN RIGHTS AND DISsENT IN CANADA 127-62 (1981).
151. See Criminal Code § 319(2) (targeting those "who, by communicating statements, other
than in private conversation, wilfully promotefJ hatred against any identifiable group.'). See
Canadian Human Rights Act § 13(1) (concerning telephone communications) (1976-77).
152. Taylor and W. Guard Party v. Canadian Human Rights Comm'n, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 116,
134 (1990); see also Keegstra, 3 C.R.R. (2d) at 226-29; Regina v. Andrews, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 176,
188 (1990). The emphasis on equality over absolutist notions of liberty pervades Canadian
constitutional law. See section 27 of the Charter.
153. Keegstra, 3 C.R.R. (2d) at 256-57.
154. See id. at 237 (stating that while dissent must be allowed to flourish "it is equally
destructive of free expression values, as well as the other values which underlie a free and
democratic society, to treat all expression as equally crucial to those principles" embodied in the
Charter); id. at 240 ("[e]xpression can work to undermine our commitment to democracy where
employed to propagate ideas anathernic [sic] to democratic values.").
155. BOYER, supra note 150, at 20.
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rights is the freedom of all citizens "to form associations or unions,"'156
subject "to reasonable restrictions" which are enacted by law "in the
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or
morality."' As in Canada, the right of association in India is formu-
lated in general terms and applies to political parties as well as all
other associations. Unlike Canada, however, in India the Supreme
Court has issued an important decision concerning the prohibition of
political parties.
At issue in the 1952 case, State of Madras v. VG. Row, 58 was an
order issued by the state government of Madras declaring the "Peoples
Education Society" unlawful. The government relied on a 1908 law
which gave it the power, after obtaining the consent of an advisory
board, to declare an association unlawful if in the opinion of a provin-
cial government, it: (1) interferes or has for its object interfering with
the administration of the law, (2) does so with regard to the public
order, or (3) constitutes a danger to the public peace.159 The govern-
ment argued that it had obtained information indicating the Society
was actively engaged in helping the banned Communist Party.6o The
question for the court was whether these restrictions met the consti-
tutional requirement of reasonableness.
The Indian court observed that "reasonableness" could not be defined
in the abstract, but must be gleaned from the circumstances surround-
ing enactment of each restriction. The court expressed considerable
reluctance to challenge the judgment of the legislature, since the
people's elected representatives had clearly found the restrictions rea-
sonable.' 61 Nevertheless, the court struck down the statute because the
legislature had failed to provide for sufficient procedural safeguards in
the application of a ban. Noting the importance of the exercise of the
right to form associations and the political reactions to a curtailment
of the right, the court stated that summary review by the advisory
board can not be a substitute for judicial review:
The formula of subjective satisfaction of the Government or of its
officers, with an Advisory Board thrown in to review the materials
on which the Government seeks to override a basic freedom guar-
anteed to the citizen, may be viewed as reasonable only in very
156. INDIA CONST. art. 19, § 1 (c).
157. Id. art. 19, § 4.
158. State of Madras v. V.G. Row, 1952 S.C.R. 597 (1952). The State of Madras decision is
still considered to be the leading case in India on both the scope of the right of association and
the test of reasonableness to be applied to restrictions on fundamental rights. See H.M. SEERVAI,
1 CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW OF INDIA 803-04 (4th ed. 1991).
159. Madras, 1952 S.C.R. at 601.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest limits, and
cannot receive judicial approval as a general pattern of reasonable
restrictions on fundamental rights.1 62
Despite its ultimate holding, the Madras opinion seems to allow for
a wide range of party prohibitions. The Indian court's main concern
was ensuring the possibility of judicial review of the factual basis for
a ban; it had little to say about the actual deprivation of rights. Indeed,
the court's emphasis on the need for judicial review of the factual basis
for bans is clearly incompatible with holding bans to be unconstitu-
tional in themselves. In the end, the Indian court's approach was a
substantive one. This is confirmed by other decisions of the court
holding that Parliament's power to amend the Indian Constitution
does not extend to dismantling fundamental features of the govern-
ment, such as the separation of powers or its republican form. 163
D. Militant Substantive Democracy: Germany, Israel, and Costa Rica
Germany, Israel, and Costa Rica illustrate the model of militant
substantive democracy.
1. Militant Substantive Democracy in Germany
When the West German constitution (the "Basic Law," now the
constitution of the unified Germany) was drafted in 1948-49, two
over-arching factors influenced its content: the fresh memory of the
Nazi regime and the aggressive communist dictatorship then consoli-
dating power in the East. These experiences fostered a strongly anti-
totalitarian mindset in the framers of the Grundgesetz. The Grundgesetz
contains several provisions collectively described by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) as expressing the principle of
"militant democracy."164 A close look at these provisions, however,
reveals that on their face they do not go much further than French
law: several core principles (including that of democracy) are unalter-
able even by constitutional amendment, 165 and all associations whose
purposes or activities violate criminal law or are directed against the
constitutional order may be prohibited.' 66
A group to which a dissolution order is addressed must challenge
that act in court. If, however, the group is a political party, the
162. Id. at 607-08.
163. See Kesavananda v. State of Charily, 1973 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461, 1535 (1973); SUND13R
ROMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS IN INDIA 1-18 (1989).
164. See Communist Party Case, 5 BVerfGE 85, 139 (1956), translated in DONALD KOwimERS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 223.
165. GRUNDGESEiZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 79, § 3 (F.R.G.).
166. Id. art. 9, § 2.
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dissolution order is initiated by the federal government filing an ap-
plication with the Bundesverfassungsgericht.67 The Court will order dis-
solution upon a finding that parties "by reason of their aims or the
behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free demo-
cratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic
of Germany. '168 A similar procedure appears in article 18. Upon ap-
plication by the federal government to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in-
dividuals may forfeit certain fundamental rights if they have used those
rights to combat the "free democratic basic order."' 69
Yet, the most important differences between the French and German
systems lie not in the written law but in their interpretation and
application. In post-war France, no association or political party has
been dissolved without a showing that it either posed a threat of
violent behavior or pursued secessionist goals. In Germany, by contrast,
two prominent and (until then) non-violent parties were declared
unconstitutional by the Bundesverfassungsgericht: the Nazi-like Sozialis-
tische Reichspartei in 1952,170 and the German Communist Party in
1956. In the second case the court adopted a higher standard of proof,
requiring that the party adopt "a fixed purpose constantly and reso-
lutely to combat the free democratic basic order" and manifest this
purpose "in political action according to a fixed plan of action."'71 This
seemingly objective standard, although formulated in terms of actual
danger to the democratic system, does not require evidence of immi-
nent harm. The focus is on a party's attitude as revealed by its con-
duct. 72 Proof of a "concrete undertaking" to that end, or evidence of
an actual danger to the democratic system, is not necessary. 73
The instruments of "militant democracy" continued to play a role
in Germany after the prohibition of the Communist Party. In the
1960s, the federal government brought applications for the forfeiture
of fundamental rights against two individuals. 174 In the 1970s, the
principle of militant democracy played an important role in a debate
167. Id. art. 21, § 2; see generally, Paul Franz, Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political Parties: A
German-American Comparison, 5 B.C. INTfL & CoMP. L. REV. 51 (1982).
168. Sozialistische Reichspartei Case, 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952), translated in KOMMERS, supra note
164, at 509.
169. The European Commission on Human Rights upheld a similar Belgian procedure under
the European Convention on Human Rights, while invalidating its application in the instant
case. De Becker Case, Application No. 214/56, Eur. Comm'n H.R., Set. B 123-29 (1962).
170. Sozialistische Reichspartei Case, 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952), translated in KomeERs, supra note
164, at 509.
171. Communist Party Case, 5 BVerfGE at 141, translated in KoM'eERS, supra note 164, at
228.
172. In the Communist Party Case the Court relied on the Party's program, its official declara-
tions, the statements of its leaders, and its educational materials. See id
173. Id.
174. 11 BVerfGE 282 (1960); 38 BVerfGE 23 (1974). The government later chose not to
pursue the cases, and the applications were eventually dismissed.
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over disloyal public servants. 175 Today, the rise of right-wing violence
following reunification has prompted the federal government to dis-
solve several organizations under article 9(2) of the Grundgesetz.176 In
addition, proceedings have been instituted before the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht to dissolve three neo-Nazi parties and to divest two right-
wing individuals of their free speech rights. 177
2. Militant Substantive Democracy in Israel
Like the United Kingdom, Israel does not possess a formal consti-
tution. However, the Israeli Knesset has passed several so-called Basic
Laws, which do not rank higher than ordinary laws but have some
constitutional significance. According to Section 7A of the Basic Law:
The Knesset, a party "shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if
its objectives or actions entail, explicitly or implicitly, one of the
following: (1) a denial of the existence of the State of Israel as the State
of the Jewish nation, (2) a denial of the democratic character of the
state, (3) incitement to racism."178
Although this rule excludes political parties only from elections, and
not from political life altogether, its essential feature is a loosely
phrased test focusing on the goals or organizing principles of a party.
This attitude-based standard thus mirrors article 21(2) of the German
Grundgesetz. Section 7A was enacted in response to a 1984 decision of
the Israeli Supreme Court which had found no legal basis for the Israeli
Election Commission's decision to bar two political parties from par-
ticipating in the Knesset elections that year. 179 When the Election
Commission, this time acting under the new section 7A, decided to
exclude the same two political parties from the next elections, the
Israeli court affirmed the exclusion of one of the two parties. 8 0 In so
doing, the court adhered to its general practice of interpreting nar-
175. See K.H.F. Dyson, Anti-Communism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 27 PAR., AFF.
51-67 (1975).
176. See 38 KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EvENTs 39,245 (1992).
177. Appl. 2 BvA 1/92; Appl. 2 BvA 2/92; Appl. 2 BvB 1/93; Appl. 2 BvB 2/93; Appl. 2
BvB 3/93. See 21 EUROPXiSCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHIFT 207 (1994).
178. This is an unofficial translation of BASIC LAw: THE KNEssET, § 7A, in Dan Gordon,
Limits on Extremist Political Parties: A Comparison of Israeli Jurisprdence with That of the United States
and West Germany, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 347, 364 n.117 (1987). No official
translation is yet available of this provision which was inserted into the BASIC LAW: THE KNEssLE
as amended in 1985, Amend. No. 9, S.H., no. 1155, at 196, translatedin 12 LAws OF THE STATE
OF ISRAEL 85. We would like to thank Judge Itzak Zamir of the Supreme Court of Israel for
providing the information in this section.
179. See Gordon, supra note 178, at 353-64.
180. Election Appeal 1/88, Naiman v. Chairman of the Central Appeal Committee of the
Twelfth Knesset, 42(4) P.D. 177 (1988).
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rowly statutes which restrict fundamental rights.18 ' Not unlike the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Communist Party case, 182 the
Israeli court focussed on party goals as shown through concrete action:
it held that in order to meet its burden, the government must prove
beyond any doubt, and by clear and unequivocal evidence, that (1) a
party has as its dominant and central objective one of the proscribed
goals set out in the statute; and (2) that it intends to implement this
goal in a concrete manner.18 3
This standard was held to be satisfied by the right-wing Kach Party,
whose objectives and activities were found to be clearly racist in the
sense contemplated by the statute.'84 The test was not satisfied by the
other party, which advocated a form of Palestinian nationalism. 185
Thus, the Court seems to have tightened the requirements of the
statute by rejecting exclusion of a party solely on the basis of its
platform.
3. Militant Substantive Democracy in Costa Rica
Costa Rica is an example of a militant democracy which has become
more tolerant over the years. Originally, article 98 of its constitution
prohibited "the founding or the activity of political parties which for
their ideological stance, means of action or international connections
try to destroy the foundations of the democratic organization of Costa
Rica, or which act against the sovereignty of the country.' 18 6 The Costa
Rican Parliament, acting on the basis of this rule, outlawed the Com-
munist Party in 1950 by the required two-thirds majority vote.18 7 In
1975, however, the formal party-prohibition procedure was abolished
by constitutional amendment. Today, article 98 of the constitution
grants citizens "the right to join parties in order to participate in
national politics," subject, however, to the restriction "that such parties
are committed in their platforms to respect the constitutional order of
the republic."'8
181. Zeev Segal, A Constitutional Law Without a Constitution: The Israeli Experience and the
American Influence, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1992).
182. See Communist Party Case, supra note 164.
183. Naiman, supra note 179.
184. Jacqueline Gatti-Domenach, Le Syst me Electoral Isralien, in REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET
DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 989, 1031-32 (1990).
185. Id.
186. Quoted in OSCAR AGuILAR BULGARELLI, DnCPoCACiA Y PARTIDOS POLITICOS EN COSTA
RICA (1950-1962) 80 (1981) (authors' translation).
187. Id. at. 84.
188. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA art. 98.
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4. Militant Substantive Democracies in Other Countries
In brief, the laws of several other established democracies also permit
restrictions on anti-democratic actors. Both the Italian and Spanish
constitutions contain a clause prohibiting the reestablishment of the
fascist party.8 9 The Portuguese constitution prohibits all paramilitary
associations which adhere to a fascist ideology.190 In Finland, a group
can only register as a political party if it demonstrates, by its actions,
a respect for democratic principles. 19 1 Austria makes it a criminal
offense to found an association dedicated to endangering national in-
dependence or the constitutionally mandated form of government. 192
And the Greek constitution prohibits the abusive exercise of funda-
mental rights. 193
In addition, the model provided by the German Grundgesetz has been
adopted by several of the new and nascent Central and Eastern Euro-
pean democracies, including Croatia, 194 Lithuania, 195 Poland, 196 Roma-
nia' 97 and Slovenia. 198 In Russia the former Constitutional Court affir-
med President Yeltsin's dissolution of the Communist Party.199 However,
189. LA COSTITUZIONE DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA [Constitution] art. XII(1) (Italy); CoN-
sTITuci6N DE ESPAfA [Constitution] art. 6 (Spain).
190. CONSTITU147AO DA REP(OBLICA PORTUGUESA [Constitution] art. 46(4) (Portugal).
191. Rainer Hofmann, Die Recht/iche Ste/lung der Minderheiten in Finnand, in 1 DAs MINDER-
HEITENRECHT EUROPAISCHER STAATEN 118 (Jochen Abr. Frowein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
MINDERHEITENRECHT]. For a discussion of prohibitions on irredentist groups in Finland, see
K.Aus TORNUDD, FINLAND AND THE INTERNATIONAL Nolims OF HUMAN RIGHTS 171 (1986).
192. Thilo Marauhn, Die Recht/iche Stellung der Minderheiten in Ostereich, in MINDERHEITEN-
REcHiT, supra note 191, at 254.
193. SINTAGMA Tis ELLATHAS [Constitution] art. 25(3) (Greece); see Prodromos Dagtoglou,
Der Mif3brauch von Grundrechten in der Griechischen Theorie und Praxis, in ILIOUPOULOS-STRANGAS,
supra note 146, at 103-16.
194. USTAV REPUBuKE HRVATSKE [Constitution] arts. 6 & 43 (Croatia) (setting out prohi-
bition procedure for all organizations that endanger the democratic constitutional order, inde-
pendence, unity, or territorial integrity of the State).
195. Liaruvos RESPUBUKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 2(3) (Lithuania) (declaring
"strictly forbidden" the establishment and activities of political parties "whose programme documents
propogare and whose activities practice racial, religious, social class inequality and hatred, methods
or authoritarian or totalitarian rule, methods of violent seizure of power, war and violent propoganda,
violation of human rights and freedoms, or other ideas or actions which are incompatible with
universally recognized norms of international law").
196. KONSTYTUCJA RZEcZYPOSPOUTEJ POLSKIEJ [Constitution] art. 84(3) (Poland) (granting
the right of association subject to the condition that "[i]t shall be prohibited to set up and to
participate in associations whose objective or activities threaten the social and political system or
the legal order of the Republic of Poland"). In Poland, an existing political party may be banned
only if a danger of violent behavior exists. See Mahulena Hoskova, Die Rcchiiche Stelug der
Minderheiten in Polen, in MINDERHEITENRECHT, supra note 191, at 299.
197. CONSTiTUT1A RosskNurI [Constitution] arts. 8(2) & 37(2) (Romania) (parties working
against "political pluralism" are unconstitutional).
198. URADNI LIST REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [Constitution] arts. 63 & 160 (Slovenia) (prohibit-
ing incitement "to national, racial, religious or other inequality and the encouragement of
national, racial, religious or other hatred and intolerance").
199. 38 KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 39,224 (1992).
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in Bulgaria the Constitutional Court refused to declare unconstitu-
tional a party supported mainly by the Turkish minority population.
This decision is surprising, given that article 11(4) of the Bulgarian
constitution expressly prohibits the formation of ethnically or relig-
iously based political parties. 200
E. Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of state practice makes clear that some form
of party prohibition procedure is common to most democratic systems.
Even the procedurally based systems do not seem inconsistent with
Rawls's observation that "[jiustice does not require that men must
stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence." 20 1 At
the same time, democratic states have substantial differences in the
treatment of extremist political actors.
Perhaps, to paraphrase Holmes, experience and not logic provides
an explanation. 20 2 The United States, with little tradition of a fascist
or monarchical right or a truly revolutionary left, generally adheres to
a procedural tolerance confident in its ability to diffuse extremist
threats through open debate. 20 3 In Germany, by contrast, the memory
of the Nazis' rise to power during the Weimar era has created profound
skepticism about the power of political competition to delegitimize
extremist groups. In multi-ethnic states such as India, elections are
often seen as challenges by sub-groups to the territorial integrity of
the state in addition to or rather than expressions of individual pref-
erences. 20 4 Limitations on ethnically based parties may result from this
perceived threat.
International norms, which are the subject of the next section,
obviously cannot assimilate all the vast diversity of this national expe-
rience. Yet there are at least two reasons why the variety of state
practice just reviewed need not frustrate the development of interna-
tional law in this area. First, we have noted there exists rough consen-
sus at a general level on the need for some form of self-protection. This
provides important common ground for adjudication of individual
disputes. As human rights tribunals evaluate cases in this area, they
200. See Emilia Drumeva, Das bulgariscbe Verfassungsgericht-Rehtsgrundlagen und erste Ent-
scheidungen, 53 ZA6RV 112, 128-29 (1993).
201. RAWLS, supra note 67, at 218.
202. OLIVER WENDELL HOLmES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923 ed.) (1883).
203. See Louis HARiz, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 3-14 (1955).
204. For example, the overwhelming victory of the Awami League in the East Pakistani
elections of December 7, 1970 on a platform of federative autonomy led directly to intervention
by the Pakistani Army, counter-intervention by the Indian Army and, ultimately, to the birth of
Bangladesh as an independent state. See generally SUBRATA RoY CHOWDHURY, THE GENESIS OF
BANGLADESH 50-58 (1972).
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will begin to give contour and detail to the general principles already
formalized in human rights instruments by drawing on aspects of
various national traditions.
The second reason for hope is precedent. Creating international law
on issues of local concern without reference to the historical tradition
of any one national community is not a problem unique to this area
of human rights. In fact, it inheres in every human rights issue. The
response of human rights law, by-in-large, has been to work at legiti-
mating certain minimum standards of conduct as universal, though at
the same time leaving room for local traditions not inconsistent with
such guarantees of basic rights. An international regime to protect
democracies may also emerge by following this pattern.
V. THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE
QUESTION OF ANTI-DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTIES
Contemporary international law favors the substantive view of de-
mocracy without entirely rejecting the procedural view. Accordingly,
the primary focus of norms on the subject lies in prescribing limits on
the potentially abusive exercise of human rights. This section focuses
on the nature of these limits. First, we will address the general per-
missibility of substantive restrictions on an open democratic process.
Second, we will explore the standards to which restrictions on civil and
political rights must conform to remain democratic. Finally, we will
review the permissibility of restrictions imposed during a state of
emergency. Since the democratic entitlement derives primarily from
global and regional human rights treaties, it is these treaties which
will be the main sources of international law on this issue.
A. Substantive Democracy in the Political Covenant and Other Human
Rights Treaties
All comprehensive human rights instruments provide that certain
key rights, normally deemed essential to effective political participa-
tion, may be restricted when "necessary in a democratic society." Ar-
ticle 22(2) of the Political Covenant, protecting the freedom of asso-
ciation, provides a typical example of such a provision:
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other
than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order, the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 20 5
205. Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 22(2). See also American Convention, supra note 5,
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Clauses permitting the restriction of these rights for the protection
of democratic society appear in articles concerning public access to
criminal trials, 2° 6 the right of assembly,20 7 the right to privacy,208 and
the freedom of religion and beliefs.20 9 The Political Covenant allows
restrictions on the freedom of movement necessary "to protect national
security, public order (ordrepublic), public health or morals or the rights
and freedoms of others, as long as the restrictions imposed are consis-
tent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 210
Similar restrictions are permitted on the freedom of expression. 211
The rights to vote and to be elected are not subject to a "democratic
society" clause; restrictions on these rights are measured by a test of
reasonableness. 212 If these provisions permitted a government to re-
strict an anti-democratic party's freedoms of expression and of associa-
tion, the party would be shut out of an electoral process.
In a comprehensive study, Oscar Garibaldi concludes that the notion
of "democracy" used by the Political Covenant's drafters in these clauses
is one describing a traditional Western society in which the panoply
of rights outlined in human rights instruments is respected in prac-
tice.213 If this view is correct, then human rights instruments do not
directly answer the question of whether restricting the rights of anti-
democratic actors is permissible in a democratic society. Rather, the
answer lies in an evaluation of the practice of those societies. As the
preceding section has shown, the banning of certain groups or political
parties is frequently considered necessary for the survival of democratic
systems. 214 According to Garibaldi's view, such restrictions are to be
considered "necessary in a democratic society" for purposes of interna-
tional law.
art. 32(2) ("The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all,
and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.'). See generally Oscar M.
Garibaldi, On the Ideological Content of Human Rights Instruments: The Clause "In a Democratic Society",
in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LoUiS B. SOHN 23
(Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1984).
206. Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 14(1); European Convention, supra note 5, art. 6(1).
207. Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 21; European Convention, supra note 5, art. 11(2);
American Convention, supra note 5, art. 15.
208. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 8(2).
209. Id arts. 2(3) & 2(4); American Convention, supra note 5, art. 22(3).
210. Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 12(3).
211. Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 19(3); European Convention, supra note 5, art. 10(2);
American Convention, supra note 5, art. 13(a).
212. Id. art. 25.
213. Garibaldi, supra note 205, at 65. Similarly, John Humphry suggests that "the General
Assembly meant by democratic society the kind of society in which the rights enunciated by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are recognized and respected." John Humphry, The Just
Requirements of Morality, Public Order and The General Wefare in a Democratic Society, in THE
PRAcTIcE OF FREEDOm 137, 147 (Ronald. St. J. MacDonald & John P. Humphry eds., 1979).
214. See discussion infra part IV.
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That the Political Covenant does not itself provide a clear picture
of what constitutes a democratic society is confirmed by an episode in
its drafting history. Early in the process, the Soviet Union offered two
amendments that would have embraced an extreme version of the
substantive view. The first provided that all organizations "of a Fascist
or anti-democratic nature" shall be "forbidden by law."215 The second
would have explicitly restricted those organizations' freedoms of assem-
bly and of association "in the interests of democracy."216 The Soviets
argued that anti-democratic organizations "could not be allowed to
assemble and associate for the purpose of overthrowing democracy."217
Both proposals were rejected. While the states opposing these amend-
ments were primarily concerned that their inclusion would legitimize
one-party Communist rule, their defeat also suggests that the Political
Covenant as a whole cannot be said to embody a consensus (anti-fascist
or otherwise) on the substantive elements of a democratic society.
Despite the outward-looking focus of the "democratic society" clauses,
other provisions of the Covenant address the legitimacy of self-protec-
tion legislation more directly. Article 5(1) of the Covenant is a mani-
festation of substantive democratic principles:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity
or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater
extent than is provided for in the present Covenant. 218
This article, and its predecessor in the Universal Declaration, 219
emerged from the drafters' memory of fascist and other extremist
parties gaining power in pre-war Europe through the exercise of pro-
tected political rights.220 In the words of the French delegate to the
215. Draft Covenant on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., 222d mrg., U.N. Doc, E/CN.4/-
222 (1949).
216. Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implenentation, U.N. ESCOR,
8th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.126 (1952).
217. U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 325th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.325 (1952) (statement
of Mr. Morozov).
218. Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 5(1). See also European Convention, supra note 5,
art. 17; American Convention, supra note 5, art. 29.
219. Article 30 of the Universal Declaration provides:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
Universal Declaration, supra note 5, art. 30.
220. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 156th Mtg. at 673, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.156 (1948)
(statement of French delegate); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Drafting Committee, 2d Sess., 28th Mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.11SR.28 (1948)
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U.N. Human Rights Commission, "[the edifice of liberty which was
erected in the Covenant must not be capable of being used against
liberty itself.' 221 Democracies should not be forced to wait until the
very moment a totalitarian take-over is imminent in order to protect
themselves. Rather, they should be able to act preemptively against a
menacing group.222
Human rights tribunals have issued a number of opinions construing
article 5(1)-type clauses and have confirmed their role as protection
against erosion of democratic systems from within. In a 1984 decision
the U.N. Human Rights Committee held that organizing a fascist
party was an act "removed from the protection of the Covenant by
article 5 thereof. '223 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights
has held that a virtually identical article of the European Convention
was designed "to prevent totalitarian groups from exploiting in their
own interest the principles enunciated by the Convention.
224
Additionally, article 20 of the Covenant requires states to prohibit
propaganda for war and the advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred.225 In a similar vein, the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination obligates states to "declare
(statement of Lebanese delegate); United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, 5th Sess., 123d Mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.123 (1949) (statement of Lebanese
delegate). This fear was not restricted to parties of the right. By 1950 some 30 states had outlawed
local communist parties. Auerbach, supra note 64, at 176 n.12.
221. U.N. Doc. E/CNA/SR.123, supra note 220, at 8.
222. The French delegate explained that the drafters
had wished to give a preventive sense to article 28 [the predecessor of Universal Declaration
art. 30], considering that it was preferable to prevent the final act which, in general, was
the outcome of a long activity. In the case of nazism and fascism, for example, the activity
had been evident for many years. If the rights and the freedoms laid down in the declaration
of human rights were really to be protected, provision should be made to prevent, at the
very beginning, any activity aimed at their destruction.
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 156th Mrg. at 673, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.156 (1948); see also
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Drafting Committee, 2d
Sess., 28th Mrg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.41AC.11SR.28 (1948) (statement of Lebanese delegate)
(predecessor of Political Covenant art. 5(1) was "based on the concept of checking and preventing
the growth of nascent nazi, fascist or other totalitarian ideologies.')
223. M.A. v. Italy, Communication No. 11711981, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE
HUmAN RIGHTS CObMITEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OPI2, at
31, 33 (1984) thereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS].
224. Lawless Case (Merits), 1961 YB. Eur. Cony. H.R. 438, 450 (Eur. Ct. H.R.); see also De
Becker Case, 123 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. (ser. B) at 137 (1962) (article 17 of European Convention
"applies only to persons who threaten the democratic system of the Contracting Parties');
Glimmerveen & Hagenbeck v. Netherlands, 1979 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 366 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.) (similar holding); Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, 1957 YB. Eur. Conv. H.R. 219
(Eur. Comm'n H.R.).
225. Political Covenant, supra note 5, arts. 20(1) & 20(2); see J.R.T. & W.G. Party v. Canada,
Communication No. 104/1981 (1983), reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 223, at 28
[hereinafter J.R.T.] (anti-Semitic messages "clearly constitute the advocacy of racial or religious
hatred" and must be prohibited under article 20(2)). Some Western states entered reservations as
to article 20, but these may be seen as limitations on its potential reach and not on the principle
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illegal and prohibit organizations" that promote or incite racial ha-
tred.226 These clauses suggest that the drafters of these instruments did
not share the proceduralists's unwavering confidence in the power of
open debate to discredit insidious ideas. Such ideas, these instruments
suggest, have real power and citizens in an open society must in some
circumstances bear responsibility for the potentially destructive conse-
quences of their advocacy.227
Also relevant is approval by various United Nations organs of self-
protection provisions in constitutions and electoral laws whose drafting
they have supervised or approved. In Namibia, 22s Cambodia,229 and
Mozambique, 230 the UN has approved electoral standards which al-
lowed for the exclusion of violent or anti-democratic groups from the
electoral process. The Secretary-General recently lent normative sig-
nificance to these actions when he stated that in providing electoral
assistance the United Nations seeks to uphold "the relevant principles
enunciated in fundamental international human rights agreements. 231
it embodies. While the European Convention does not contain a comparably explicit provision,
it has been interpreted to permit anti-hate propaganda laws. See Glimmerveen & Hagenbeck,
supra note 224.
226. Race Convention, supra note 5, at 219.
227. The U.N. Human Rights Committee, in a comment on these provisions, explained that
the right of free expression "carries with it special duties and responsibilities." U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 110, U.N. Doc. A/38/40/Annex (1983).
228. The Namibian Constitution provides that political parties shall be "subject to such
qualifications prescribed by law as are necessary in a democratic society." NAbDIB. CoNsT. art.
17(1).
229. The Paris Peace Accords, which set out a comprehensive scheme of human rights
guarantees as part of a new political order in Cambodia, state that parties competing in the
supervised elections must adopt platforms "consistent with the principles and objectives of the
Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement." Final Act of the Paris Conference on Camloda,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, at 3, U.N. Doc. A146/608lAnnex (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
174, 198 (1992).
230. The General Peace Agreement, which sets out principles to guide the first post-war
elections, provides that freedoms of expression, association and political activity "shall not extend
to the activities of unlawful private paramilitary groups or groups which promote violence in any
form or terrorism, racism or separatism." General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, U.N. Doc.
S/24635/Annex, at 13 (1992).
231. Electoral Guidelines Report, supra note 7, at 1. The one U.N. mission that seems to run
counter to this trend is the supervision of a plebiscite in Malawi. There, the Malawian people
were asked whether they wished to continue the one-pary rule of President-for-life H. Kamuzu
Bands. Report of the U.N. Technical Team on the Conduct of a Free and Fair Referendum on the Iste of
a One Party/Multiparty System in Malawi (15-21 Nov. 1992), April 14, 1993, U.N. Doc A/48/120.
Malawi has one of the worst human rights records in Africa and there was little doubt that a
vote to continue one-party rule would result in more of the same. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WoR.D REPORT 1993 25-30 (1992). Yet in agreeing to provide advice on the campaign for and
structure of the referendum, and to monitor the vote itself, the U.N. appeared ready to accept a
decision nor requiring multiparty participation. In many ways such an outcome would resemble
the election of an anti-democratic party. As it turned out the Malawian people voted overwhelm-
ingly against one-party rule and so the question remained academic. Reuters News Service,
Opposition Says It Won Vote to Oust Dictator in Malawi, N.Y. TMMES, June 16, 1993, at A13.
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In sum, article 5(1) of the Covenant, accompanying U.N. and re-
gional practice, and state practice with respect to "democratic society"
clauses all suggest that a state may introduce party-prohibition proce-
dures or equivalent restrictions, such as stripping individuals of certain
fundamental rights, under certain circumstances.
B. The Limits to Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights
More difficult than establishing the principle that anti-democratic
actors may be excluded from the electoral process is determining
where, according to human rights law, the precise limits of this power
lie. What standard must a government meet to justify an exclusion?
The answer lies in interpretation of human rights instruments as
informed by state practice.
1. The Applicable Standard
a. The Abuse Clause in Context
The Political Covenant seems not to contain any standard regarding
restrictions on the rights of anti-democratic actors.232 Accordingly, the
Human Rights Committee held that the (re)establishment of a fascist
party in Italy was "removed from the protection of the Covenant by
article 5 thereof.' 233 In a similar vein, the European Commission of
Human Rights held that the equivalent provision of the European
Convention was "of a more general nature" than the Convention's
"necessary in a democratic society" limitation clause, therefore making
that clause inapplicable to restrictions on anti-democratic actors.23
4
These rather categorical decisions would seem to suggest that restrictions
on anti-democratic parties are so clearly permitted by human rights
treaties that the restrictions need not be justified by any formula or
threshold of proof.
But such an interpretation cannot be correct. If a government were
permitted to deprive a political actor of protected rights merely by
labelling him "anti-democratic," then these treaties would lose much
of their practical effect. 235 Many of the Covenant's provisions, particu-
232. Article 5(1) simply states that those who "engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the [protected] rights and freedoms" enjoy no independent
right to do so. Political Covenant, supra note 5, arc. 5(1).
233. M.A. v. Italy, supra note 223, at 33.
234. Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, supra note 224, at 224.
235. Frowein argues that the invocation of article 17 of the European Convention must be
very carefully reviewed lest its application should itself become a danger to the democratic system.
JOCHEN ABR. FhowIN, EUROPX'ISCHE MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION-EMRK-KoMMENTAR
339 (Jochen Frowein & Wolfgang Peukert eds., 1985).
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larly those regarding freedom of expression and conscience, are de-
signed specifically to prevent the uncontrolled suppression of political
dissent based on spurious claims of subversion and "anti-state" activity.
Consequently, the reasoning in the two decisions cited above should
not be interpreted too literally. Both tribunals were confronted with
cases of party prohibition for the first time, and in both the outcome
was never in doubt: the Italian Fascist party and German Communist
party had always belonged to a small group of obvious candidates for
prohibition proceedings. It is not surprising, therefore, that both tri-
bunals were concerned primarily with establishing the principle of
allowing exclusions rather than delineating its contours and possible
limitations.
When confronted with more ambiguous cases, however, tribunals
must move beyond such a simplistic interpretation. Article 5 of the
Political Covenant and its regional equivalents stand in the larger
context of the entire instruments, and they must not be given inter-
pretations which would frustrate the essence of the rights guaranteed.
It necessarily follows that states cannot enjoy unlimited powers to
exclude political actors under abuse clauses such as article 5.
The European Court has rendered a decision in an analogous setting
which may serve as a useful guide in this regard. In language which
resembles that of Article 5(1), Article 10(1)(3) of the European Con-
vention declares that the duty to respect the freedom of expression
"shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises." Despite suggestions to the contrary,
the European Court of Human Rights refused to interpret this so-
called "broadcasting clause" in isolation but required that its applica-
tion be considered in the context of the Convention's ordinary limita-
tion clause. 236 This clause, which appears in paragraph 2 of Article 10,
allows only those restrictions which are "necessary in a democratic
society." The court acknowledged that the broadcasting clause itself
states only that licensing systems may be established; it sets no limits
on the scope of the clause and thus its potential abuse. The absence of
such limits in the text, however, does not mean "that licensing meas-
ures shall not otherwise be subject to the requirements of paragraph
2, for that would lead to a result contrary to the object and purpose
of Article 10 taken as a whole. '237
The European Court thus recognized that to interpret the broadcast-
ing clause in isolation would not be consistent with a broader purpose
236. Groppera Case, 173 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1990); sew also Autronic Case, 173 Eur.Ct.H.R.
(ser. A) at 24 (1990).
237. Id. This holding was reaffirmed in the Informationsverein Lentia Case, 176 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser.
A) at 29-33 (1993).
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of the treaty, which was to further free expression. This holding em-
bodies a broader rule of treaty law: a provision must be interpreted in
light of its context and of the treaty's object as a whole.238 The court's
reasoning may therefore be applied to the Political Covenant. Assum-
ing that requiring no standard of proof for the application of Political
Covenant article 5 is untenable, two standards suggest themselves as
interpretive devices to limit recourse to the abuse clause. These are the
ordinary limitation clauses of the rights at issue: "necessary in a demo-
cratic society" (articles 14(1), 21, 22(2)) and "without unreasonable
restrictions" (article 25).
Of course such a borrowing of ordinary limitation clauses cannot
serve to frustrate the ultimate purpose of article 5, which is to prevent
anti-democratic actors from using protected liberties as a vehicle to
realize their goals. Thus, the limitations clauses can only fit comfort-
ably with article 5 if they permit governments sufficient flexibility to
confront such threats. Accordingly, we will treat these clauses as points
of interpretive departure rather than literal injunctions.
Such an approach does not mix mutually incompatible rules. 23
9
Traces of this approach can be found in the opinion of the Human Rights
Committee in the Italian case, M.A. v. Italy,240 and in the opinion of
the European Commission of Human Rights in the De Becker Case.
24 1
b. The Standards of Reasonableness and Necessity
What is the nature of these two alternative standards? The difference
between "reasonableness" and "necessity" emerges from a distinction
basic to the Covenant as a whole. As is suggested by its title, the
Covenant guarantees both "civil" and "political" rights. Civil rights,
such as freedom of expression and association, are those which guarantee
individuals or groups certain freedoms from state interference. Political
rights, such as the right to free and fair elections, are those which
facilitate participation in public affairs. 242 The difference is not merely
238. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
239. See Frowein, sa'pra note 235, at 340.
240. M.A. v. Italy, Communication No. 117/1981, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra
note 223, at 33 (1984) ("[The] acts ... were in any event justifiably prohibited by Italian law
having regard to the limitations and restrictions applicable to the rights in question under the
provisions of articles 18 (3), 19 (3), 22 (2) and 25 of the Covenant").
241. De Becker Case, supra note 224, at 137 ("[Un one sense, then, Article 17 is of somewhat
limited scope: it applies only to persons who threaten the democratic system of the Contracting
Parties and then to an extent strictly proportionate to the seriousness and duration of such a
threat, as is also confirmed by article 18 [prohibiting restrictions on rights for reasons other than
those for which they have been prescribed]."). See also Glimmerveen & Hagenbeck, supra note
224, at 380-82 (carefully reviewing invocation of Article 17 by the Dutch Government).
242. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: A CCPR
COMMENTARY 436 (1993).
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semantic, since the Covenant provides for different types of restrictions
in each category. While restrictions on most "civil rights" are permitted
only if "necessary in a democratic society," the right to democratic
governance in article 25 is only guaranteed "without unreasonable
restrictions." The Covenant's drafting history suggests that the restrictions
clause of article 25 was intended primarily to cover issues of eligibility
to vote, such as age and mental capacity.243 But neither the legislative
history nor the text precludes use of this clause to evaluate more
far-reaching restrictions on the right to be elected, such as excluding
a party from taking part in elections. A candidate's obligation to
respect the democratic system may be seen as a consequence of "the
higher responsibility associated with election to a public office," 244 and
thus may be subject to the limitations clause in article 25. Given the
clear inapplicability of the "necessary in a democratic society" standard
to article 25 rights, it seems logical to look to the more lenient
"without unreasonable restrictions" standard in regard to the right to
political participation.245
According to this distinction between the "civil" right of association
and the "political" right of standing for election, if a political party is
excluded only from taking part in elections, such a restriction should
be measured according to the "reasonableness" standard. Strictly speak-
ing, the freedoms of expression (Covenant article 19) and of association
(Covenant article 22) are not at issue, and so neither is the "necessity"
standard. As rights to be free from interference, they do not involve
an affirmative right of participation. If, however, all activities of a
political party are prohibited, both the right of the party's members
to associate (Covenant article 22(1)) and their freedom of expression
(Covenant article 19) would be implicated. Such a measure would
require additional justification under the stricter standard of "necessity
in a democratic society."
One objection to applying different standards of review to the
exclusion of political parties from elections on the one hand and their
total prohibition on the other is that the rights in question are not
readily or neatly distinguishable. After all, the freedoms of expression
and association derive much of their value from the roles they play in
the electoral process. Similarly, the right to political participation is
meaningless if it is not preceded and accompanied by an open and
vigorous debate between all relevant political actors.
243. la at 445; see Fox, supra note 3, at 553-54.
244. NoWAK, supra note 242, at 446-47.
245. On the distinction between "unreasonableness" and stricter standards in administrative
law, see Itzhak Zamir, Unreasonableness, Balance of Interests and Proportionality, in TEL Aviv SruDwis
iN LAw 131-36 (1992).
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Yet making this distinction does not artificially disassociate one
right from the other. It simply recognizes differences in the respective
severity of each deprivation and adjusts the legal standard accordingly.
The European Commission of Human Rights recognized such a gra-
dation of political rights when it held that the right to vote "does not
give the citizen a right to demand that all political parties competing
in an election be granted radio and television coverage or be granted
the same amount of such coverage. '24 6 It thereby rejected a challenge
to Irish legislation denying use of the broadcast media to repre-
sentatives of known terrorist organizations.247 Following this principle,
human rights law may require a stricter standard of review when a
political group is banned from the political process altogether, as
opposed to its mere exclusion from an election.
This distinction is also embodied in the difference between German
and Israeli law.24 8 In Germany, certain radical groups cannot engage in
public debate at all, while in Israel such groups are excluded only from
the electoral process. That both systems can be supported by rational
arguments suggests that the distinction we propose represents an im-
portant value judgment-on which these two legitimate democratic
regimes differ-concerning the capacity of particular democratic socie-
ties to withstand ideological assault.
2. Refining "Reasonable" and "Necessary" Restrictions
The difference between a strict standard of "necessity in a democratic
society" (concerning restrictions on civil rights) and a more lenient
standard of "reasonableness" (concerning restrictions of the political
right of democratic governance), however, is not self-evident; further
refinement is necessary. If a restriction must be "necessary in a demo-
cratic society," it must also pass a test of proportionality. The require-
ment that a response be proportional, if it is claimed as necessary,
appears in international law in a variety of contexts. 249 In human rights
law, the proportionality principle "requires that the type and intensity
of an interference be absolutely necessary to attain a purpose."
250
If, on the other hand, a restriction must only be "not unreasonable,"
interpretations of this term in the Anglo-American tradition suggest
that measures are justified as long as they are not "capricious or
246. Betty Purcell et al. v. Ireland, App. No. 15404/89, 70 Eur. Comm'n. H.R Dec. & Rep.
262 (1991), reprinted in 12 HuM. RTs. L.J. 254, 260 (1991).
247. Id.
248. See discussion supra parts IV.D.1-.2.
249. For example, the two are essential elements of a state's traditional right of self-defense.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua: Merits (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27).
250. NOWAK, supra note 242, at 211, 379 & 394.
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arbitrary, manifestly unjust, made in bad faith, oppressive etc." 251
Thus, a proportionality standard proceeds from the assumption that
every restrictive measure must be shown to be necessary, while a
reasonableness standard requires only that the decision be not clearly
unjustifiable. In the first case, the state carries a heavy burden of proof
to justify its restrictive measure, while in the second, the party affected
by the restrictive measure must be able to identify a clearly verifiable
error of judgment by the state. Thus, a proportionality standard is
clearly more favorable to (i.e., less restrictive of the rights of) parties
and citizens who are subject to restrictions by the state.
Two factors must be considered, however, which blur this seemingly
bright line between the two standards. First, in human rights law, the
proportionality principle is generally mitigated by a "margin of appre-
ciation" accorded to state parties by international supervisory organs. 252
The scope of the margin depends on the nature of the activities
involved.253 It is particularly generous with regard to actions which
domestic authorities regard as critical to the prevention of disorder or
crime. 254 Thus, a wide margin of appreciation would likely be accorded
to a determination that a political actor constituted a threat to the
survival of the democratic system. The presumption against the per-
missibility of restrictions is thereby largely reversed.
Second, the standard of "reasonableness" may become more rigid
depending on the nature of the right or the type of restriction at issue.
For example, the Human Rights Committee strengthened the "reason-
ableness" standard of article 25 of the Political Covenant by introduc-
ing the principle of proportionality in a case in which an individual,
for political reasons, had been deprived of his right to vote and to be
elected for fifteen years. 25 5 Although these mitigating factors do not
make the two standards indistinguishable, they do suggest that to-
gether they constitute a sliding scale which permits certain more or
less far-reaching restrictions on the rights at issue. The application of
this sliding scale in particular cases must take place with due regard
to the usual practice of democratic states.
251. Zamir, supra note 245, at 131.
252. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-23 (1976) ("margin
of appreciation" referring to a limited deference accorded to domestic authorities in their judg-
ment on whether certain "restrictions" and "penalties" are "necessary in a democratic society"
pursuant to article 10, section 2 of the Convention).
253. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-22 (1981).
254. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3898/68, [1971] 13 YB. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 666,
684.
255. Pietrararoia v. Uruguay, Communication No. 44/1979, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DIuc-
SIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COimiTrrEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, at 76, 79 U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1981).
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This analytical framework suggests the following hierarchy. The
most severe and suspect restriction on the right to free elections is the
establishment of a one-party system.25 6 As the Human Rights Com-
mittee has recognized, the breadth of restrictions involved in silencing
all organized political opposition renders the one-party state unreason-
able per se.257 A less severe type of restriction is to exclude from
elections those parties or individuals which pose a threat to the state's
democratic form of governance. Since article- 5 of the Covenant ex-
pressly legitimizes the fight against enemies of democracy, such exclu-
sions are permissible under a less stringent standard of "reasonable-
ness." The total prohibition of a political party, on the other hand,
must satisfy a higher level of scrutiny since such a measure impinges
not only on the right to free and fair elections but also the freedom of
association, a right which is subject to the standard of "necessity in a
democratic society." But given the margin of appreciation accorded to
governments in such complex and difficult cases, and given the over-
riding importance of the abuse exception in article 5 of the Covenant,
this difference may not always be very great. Finally, because individuals
typically pose less of a threat to the democratic system than organized
groups, restrictions on their rights are subject to stricter scrutiny.
Under these standards, it appears that a fundamentalist religious
party which expressly denied the legitimacy of democratic rule and
instead promised that once in power, the highest secular authority
would derive from certain sacred texts as interpreted by unelected
"wise men" would fall into the category of excludable anti-democratic
actors.
3. Forms of Conduct Prohibitable by Article 5
What forms of conduct justify application of article 5 as interpreted
above? We focus here on the total prohibition of a political party,
which is far more common in national legal systems than the Israeli
practice of mere exclusion from the electoral process. Since such a
measure is subject to a rather low level of scrutiny ("reasonableness"),
it might seem appropriate to require that such groups at least engage
in specific destructive "acts" or "activity" to justify state action against
them. Merely holding anti-democratic opinions would not be sufficient
under this standard. This view finds some support in the drafting
history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and among some
commentators.
258
256. See Fox, supra note 3, at 556-60.
257. Bwalya v. Zambia, supra note 12, at 6.6.
258. U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 155th mtg. at 667, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.155 (1948)
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The problem with this view, however, is that the Political Covenant
itself, in article 20, requires that governments punish individuals or
groups on the ground of certain offensive beliefs. Moreover, a fair
number of established democracies have at times considered it neces-
sary to prohibit political groups or parties on much lesser grounds than
a demonstrable threat to the system. In France, secessionist goals alone
were sufficient to ban certain groups.259 In West Germany, a crypto-
Nazi party was banned without the government having to show that
it posed an actual danger.26° In Israel, certain parties may be excluded
from elections if their goal is primarily to spread racist propaganda. 261
In the United States, the Supreme Court in the 1950s diluted its
danger oriented standard to such a degree that one can legitimately
ask whether it had not become mainly fictitious. 262 And on the inter-
national plane, the European Commission of Human Rights has ex-
pressly confirmed that the abuse-prohibition clause of article 17 of the
European Convention would justify the prohibition of a party merely
upon evidence of anti-democratic goals, even if it were established that
the party would limit its activities to acquiring power by legal means.263
This practice suggests that a party may reasonably be considered a
threat to democratic institutions based upon (1) its members holding
anti-democratic beliefs, and (2) a manifest intent to act on those beliefs
through the vehicle of the party. The evidence need not include the
commission of violent acts directed against the democratic infrastruc-
ture (though such acts would certainly constitute powerful evidence of
a specific intent). The fact that a group organizes itself into a political
party-thus by definition seeking to implement its agenda into law-
might permit an inference of intent to be drawn. Under this formula-
tion, small parties as well as large movements that have made sig-
nificant electoral gains may be subject to restriction. The legitimacy
of this decidedly preemptive approach, applicable to large and small
groups alike, traces its roots to two aspects of the Weimar experience.
First was the mistaken belief on the part of political moderates that
either Hitler would not pursue his stated agenda once in power, or
that his coalition partners would not permit him to do so. Second was
(statement of Mr. Jim~nez de Ar&haga, Uruguay) ("[The word 'acts' did nor include opinions,
but did include conspiracy and attempts, whether successful or not, to destroy any of the rights
and freedoms prescribed in the declaration."); see also Thomas Buergenthal, To Respea and Ensure:
State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 72, 88-89
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981); NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 79 (1950).
259. See discussion infra part V.C.1.
260. See discussion infra part 1V.D.1.
261. See discussion infra part IV.D.2.
262. See discussion infra part IV.B.
263. Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, supra note 224, at 224-25.
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the practical impossibility of restricting or banning the Nazi Party
after its representation in the Reichstag jumped from 12 to 107 seats
in the elections of September 1930, thereby making it the second
largest party in Germany.264
While readers from the United States in particular may find such
inferences of intent difficult to accept, it is important to remember
that the entire problem of anti-democratic parties arises precisely be-
cause those parties are not engaged in anti-state violence. There is no
question that states may criminalize and punish acts of revolutionary
terrorism. What is involved here is a more subtle threat, one which
becomes manifest only when citizens organize groups with professed
anti-democratic goals and demonstrate an intention to act on those
goals. A finding of requisite intent cannot help but draw upon state-
ments of belief, delineations of goals and exhortations to support the
cause. In the end, deciding that a specific anti-democratic intention
indeed exists is a difficult but essential judgment call for the state and
the international community to make.
4. A Meaningful Formula
It would appear that the abuse prohibition clauses and their "mar-
gins of appreciation" permit governments to ban political parties on
the basis of their organization around certain professed beliefs that are
considered inherently dangerous. Can this standard be said to embody
real, judicially identifiable limits on state power in this area? This
question becomes particularly acute if a state claims, as some have, that
its continued existence as a democracy is threatened not by one, but a
multitude of anti-democratic actors (nationalist, separatist, religious
fundamentalist, communist, racist, etc.). In Mozambique, for example,
the United Nations has agreed to monitor elections which will include
only parties whose objectives are "non-regional, non-tribal, non-sepa-
ratist, non-racial, non-ethnic and non-religious. ''265 Do the ordinary
restriction clauses of the Covenant permit such an extreme narrowing
of the political spectrum?
The answer will necessarily be context specific. Only in cases of
extreme political instability such as Mozambique may it be considered
"reasonable" or "necessary" for governments to radically narrow the
range of political actors; such measures are clearly not permitted in all
cases. A meaningful formula, which is applicable to all cases, must
proceed along the following lines. The "margin of appreciation" enti-
tles the government to determine, in the first instance, whether a
264. NICHOLLS, supra note 33, at 124.
265. General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, supra note 230, at 9.
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particular political group, by its words or deeds, is sufficiently danger-
ous as to pose a threat to the c6ntinued existence of the state's demo-
cratic system. Such discretion, however, goes hand in hand with the
capacity of international organs with supervisory authority over human
rights issues to decide whether the government has "exercised its
discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith.'
266
This formula is particularly well-suited as a global standard.26 It is
similar to the traditional "reasonableness standard" which is used in
British and American administrative law.268 Its use is justified for
several reasons: it has a textual basis in article 25 of the Covenant ("no
unreasonable restrictions"); it is widely used in other legal systems-
under different names269---as a more lenient standard of review for
decisions which involve highly complex assessments of facts and pre-
diction of future developments; it is abuse-oriented and therefore com-
plementary to the abuse clause of article 5 of the Covenant; and it allows
a degree of supervision which adapts to the particular facts of a case.
Important test cases for such a standard have arisen from Turkey's
recent prohibition of moderate Kurdish oriented parties. Some of these
cases are currently pending before the European Commission of Hu-
man Rights.270 The case of the Turkish Socialist Party is particularly
instructive. This party distanced itself from any form of separatism but
nonetheless advocated constitutional amendments that would trans-
form the unitary Turkish state into a two-member federal state con-
sisting of a Turkish part and a Kurdish part.271 Since the Turkish
constitution prohibits the exercise of fundamental rights for the pur-
pose of destroying the "indivisible integrity of the territory and the
people and the existence of the Turkish state,"272 the Turkish Consti-
tutional Court held that the party could be banned. 273 In its judgment
it also referred to article 17 of the European Convention and held that
266. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1979).
267. While this standard has been rejected by the European Court of Human Rights in Stiday
Times as granting too much discretion to governments under the European Convention, the
diversity of political systems and traditions outside Europe makes a broad grant of discretion
highly appropriate.
268. But cf Zamir, sjpra note 245.
269. In France, for example, the equivalent standard would be the "erreur manifeste d'appre-
ciation." See RECUuIL DES D9cISIONS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 611 (1970) (Soci& anonyme "Librairic
Frangois Maspero'). For a comparative evaluation, see Georg Nolte, Der Wert formeller Kontrolldi-
chtemaflst/'be, in DIE KONTROLLDICHTE BEs DER GERICHTLICHEN DBERPROFUNG VON HANDLUN-
GEN DER VERWALTUNG 278 (Jochen Abr. Frowein ed., 1993).
270. We are grateful to Dr. JSrg Polakiewicz of the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Council
of Europe for providing us with this information.
271. Christian Rumpf, Dar Verbot der Sozialistischen Partier durcb das turkische Verfassungsgericht,
6 ZErrSCHRuFr FUER TUERKEISTUDEN (forthcoming Jan. 1995) (manuscript on file with authors);
see also the summary of the decision in the Turkish Constitutional Court concerning the prohibi-
tion of the Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) in 2 BUL. CONST'L CASE LAW (1994).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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it was "beyond doubt" that the activities of the Socialist Party violated
the provisions of the Convention.274 One judge in dissent argued that
this question was far from clear.275 This would indeed seem to be a
borderline case, requiring the European Court of Human Rights to
engage in a thorough review of the facts.
5. Procedural Limitations
Unfortunately, substantive standards alone cannot ensure that gov-
ernmental overreaching will not occur, particularly when the state
concerned does not allow its citizens to bring individual petitions
under the Covenant's Optional Protocol. This leaves significant potential
for abuse which can only be ameliorated if a government must respect
certain procedural requirements before implementing a banning order.
That procedural steps must be followed is indicated by the practice
of both states and international organs. Each democratic state we have
surveyed provides for judicial review of prohibition decisions.276 The
Indian Supreme Court even declared that a law empowering the gov-
ernment to dissolve political organizations would be invalid if it did
not provide for judicial review.277 This requirement is particularly
relevant to the formulation of a global standard, coming as it does from
a court in a developing country with a multi-ethnic and multi-religious
population. On the international plane, the Human Rights Committee
has already taken a first step toward exercising review powers by
imposing a strict burden of proof on a state that has failed to give clear
reasons for depriving an individual of his political rights, including the
right to be elected. 278 Both state and international practice suggest,
therefore, that party prohibitions are only justifiable under the Cove-
nant if their validity can be tested before an independent tribunal or
other body. Such an institutional safeguard ensures that the final deci-
sion on a ban will not come from the political branches of government,
which may have a direct stake in outlawing an opponent. This is the
logic behind the German system, 279 which has been upheld by the




276. See discussion supra part IV.
277. State of Madras, supra note 158, at 607-08.
278. Tour6n v. Uruguay, Communication No. 32/1978, reprinted in Selected Decisions of the
Human Rights Committee Under the Optional Protocol, Human Rights Committee, 33d Sess., at 61,
62, U.N. Doc. CCPRJCIOPI1 (1978).
279. See U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 4th Sess., 96th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CISR.96,
(1978) (West German representative explains to U.N. Human Rights Committee that power to
ban subversive parties is vested exclusively in the Federal Constitutional Court "in order to
prevent a governing party from eliminating an opposition party for political reasons.")
280. Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, supra note 224.
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C. States of Emergency
Assuming a state had neither enacted nor applied self-protection
legislation, could it prevent an anti-democratic party from assuming
power after an electoral victory by declaring a state of emergency? This
is essentially the Algerian case.281 All comprehensive human rights
instruments permit derogations in times of public emergency,282 though
the American Convention does not permit derogation from the right
to political participation. 28 3
The Political Covenant and European Convention require that the
following conditions be fulfilled before a state of emergency may be
legitimately declared: (1) the emergency must be actual or at least
imminent; (2) its effects must involve the whole population; (3) the
threat must be to the life of the nation; (4) the declaration of emer-
gency must be a last resort; (5) the declaration must be a temporary
measure; and (6) the state party must immediately notify a treaty
organ of the measures taken and the reasons therefor.28 4 Each of these
elements except number (3) essentially poses a question of fact. As
such, the answers will tend to be case-specific. The question of whether
the election of an anti-democratic party threatens the "life of the
nation,"2 8 5 however, implicates broader philosophical issues and so is
more susceptible to discussion as a question of law.
The "life of the nation" refers not only to its physical continuation
as an independent state, although clearly the attempted annexation of
a state would justify derogation. 28 6 The phrase also encompasses some
281. Two technical issues make the Algerian case more complicated. First, the state of
emergency was declared several weeks after the cancelling of the elections, thus precluding the
government from justifying actions taken before the declaration. Second, in its notification of the
state of emergency to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Algeria did not derogate from
article 25 of the Covenant, relying instead on its derogation from other articles. Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 47th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1128 (1992) (state-
ment of Algerian representative).
282. Political Covenant, supra note 5, arc. 4; European Convention, supra note 5, art, 15;
American Convention, supra note 5, art. 27.
283. American Convention, supra note 5, art. 27(2). The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has held that a four-year postponement of elections is not a per se violation of
article 27(2)-its provision requiring genuine elections-only that "the date proposed for calling
the elections is too far off." INTER-AmERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON
THE SITUATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUuc OF NICARAGUA at 139, OEAlser.IJVJII.53,
doc. 25 (1981).
284. JAIME OAA, HuzatAN RIGHTS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
27-30 (1992).
285. The phrasing of the two conventions varies only slightly. The Political Covenant speaks
of a "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation." Political Covenant, supra note 5,
art. 4(1). The European Convention speaks of a "war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation." European Convention, supra note 5, art. 15(1). By contrast, the American
Convention refers to a "war, public danger, or other public emergency that threatens the
independence or security of a State party." American Convention, supra note 5, art. 27(1).
286. ORA, supra note 284, at 12.
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notion of the state continuing in its present political configuration or
constitutional structure. 287 This interpretation is suggested not only by
the fact that many national constitutions consider "danger to the
constitution" to be a ground for emergency rule,288 but also by the
human rights treaties themselves. The continued existence of a demo-
cratic society is one of their foremost objectives. 289 The European
Commission of Human Rights has confirmed that the emergency
clause of the European Convention can be invoked if the threat chal-
lenges "the organized life of the community of which the state is
composed."290
If the concept of "threat to the life of the nation" includes threats
to its basic constitutional order, the question arises whether the emer-
gency clauses can justify self-protection measures by unelected regimes,
such as in Algeria. The answer will depend on the nature of the
political actors involved. Because human rights treaties prescribe re-
gimes that respect human rights and hold regular and genuine elec-
tions, the establishment of such a government cannot, by definition,
be considered a threat to the life of the nation. A mildly repressive
regime-one, for example, which respected most human rights but did
not hold regular and genuine elections-would seem to have the right
to protect itself against the coming into office of a regime which would
also violate human rights but on a much greater scale. In the Algerian
case, these principles could lead to one or the other result depending
on whether a FIS government could be expected to violate human
rights to a substantially greater degree than the incumbent govern-
ment, which would stay in power if the election results were not
respected. 29 '
An important aspect of this analysis is whether a FIS government
would be less likely than the current government to hold elections in
287. See SUBRATA Roy CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 36-40
(1989).
288. U.N. DEPT OF INT'L EcONOMIcS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, STUDY OF THE RIGHT OF EVERYONE
TO BE FREE FROM ARBITRRy ARREST, DETENTION AND EXILE at 184, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/826/-
Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 65.XIV.2 (1964); Article 20(4) of the German Grundgesetz, for instance,
suggests this idea when it extends emergency powers to every individual in the case of an attempt
to overturn the (free democratic) constitutional orderwhere no effective help from state organs
can be expected.
289. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-FIRST CONFERENCE
HELD AT PARIs 59 (1984) ("It is neither desirable nor possible to stipulate in abstracto what
particular type or types of events will automatically constitute a public emergency within the
meaning of the term: each case has to be judged on its own merits, taking into account the
overriding concern for the continuance of a democratic society.'); see also ORAX, supra note 284,
at 30-31.
290. The Lawless Case, supra note 224, at 474.
291. Article 25 of the Covenant would not permit this situation to remain static; the necessity
of holding "periodic" elections would require that an election without the FIS be held at the
earliest opportunity.
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the future. But the holding of elections is only one of many human
rights potentially at risk, and assuming both sides in the Algerian
conflict would engage in some human rights violations, determining
the relative value of each right is crucial to deciding whether the "life
of the nation" is threatened. One must ask, therefore, whether the
acceptance of the results of democratic elections-a realization of an
important human right is of such intrinsic value that it justifies
putting respect for certain other human rights at risk. Although it may
be impossible to answer this question in a way that would be useful
in resolving all specific cases, it seems that agreement could be reached
on certain clear-cut situations. For example, if the only risk engendered
by an Islamic fundamentalist party coming to power would be that all
women would be required to cover their hair in public, it would not
be permissible to cancel elections. On the other hand, if such a party
had clearly indicated it would not only cancel all future elections but
would also introduce discriminatory measures clearly violative of other
fundamental human rights, the result would be the opposite.
Two objections can be raised against this approach. First, it may
seem rather disingenuous for a regime to declare a state of emergency
after losing an election to an anti-democratic party which it had
allowed to participate without restriction. Such a "crisis" would appear
to be largely of its own making. But this view is tantamount to
obligating an incumbent regime to exclude an anti-democratic party
from an election; it forecloses the possibility of any other restrictive
measures once the decision has been made to allow the party to
participate. Given a choice between preemptive exclusion through
self-protection legislation and exclusion after-the-fact by declaring a
state of emergency, a government might reasonably choose to avoid the
fall-out associated with a preemptive ban and instead concentrate on
persuading voters, in the course of an electoral campaign, of the danger
posed by its opponents. Such a response does not "create" a crisis; it
simply reflects the reasonable (though surely disputable) view that a
preemptive ban, while arguably less restrictive, would only exacerbate
the situation.
Second, it might be argued that states of emergency are generally
disfavored in international law. The broad suspensions of civil liberties
they permit are often used as cover for suppression of a regime's
political opponents rather than as genuine responses to crises.29 2 And
once declared, they allow for concentrations of power that are at odds
292. As an early UN study on political discrimination concluded:
The most drastic type of discrimination in this sphere, found in some countries, consists of
the total suppression of all political parties and organizations. While clearly discriminatory,
such action has been explained in most cases as a temporary emergency measure, necessary
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with the pluralism at the heart of human rights law. One might argue,
therefore, that if a state has not taken timely steps to ban anti-demo-
cratic forces through an established legal process, it should not be
permitted to do so later under an abuse-prone emergency rule.
However, such a rigid view is unwarranted for severalreasons. First,
self-protection legislation is itself subject to abuse and it is by no
means clear a priori that it constitutes a less restrictive alternative.
Second, self-protection legislation carries the unique danger of creating
martyrs or escalating political struggles into to full-scale civil war,
thereby increasing the danger to the system. As we have noted, this
could well have been the case had the Nazi party been banned after
receiving just over thirty-seven percent of the vote in the July 1932
elections. 293 Third, as we have also noted, it is often quite difficult to
estimate the danger posed by a party until it actually comes dose to
or assumes power. A regime might reasonably conclude that a party's
anti-democratic zealotry will subside once it assumes office. Finally, the
danger of abuse can, to a certain extent, be mitigated through inter-
national supervision. In The Greek Case, for example, the European
Commission of Human Rights rejected the government's claim that a
potential Communist takeover threatened the life of the nation.
294
While grave dangers lurk in the imposition of a state of emergency,
the legal standard of a "threat to the life of the nation" would appear
to be met only where a party threatens a significant worsening of the
human rights situation, including the suspension of future elections.
The mixed international reaction to the Algerian crisis, which fell far
short of outright condemnation, tends to support this view. Even before
the election, several of Algeria's North African neighbors had formed
a joint task force to persuade Western countries of the need to preserve
their regimes, however repressive, in the face of "radical Islam."'295 For
their part, many Western governments "quietly criticised the . . .
[ruling council's] cancellation of elections in January and the sub-
sequent state of emergency, but have continued to provide economic
support."296 The European Community issued a rather anemic state-
to the survival and growth of the State. However, in some notable instances it has become
a permanent arrangement, reflecting the philosophy of the Government, and therefore a
persistent form of discrimination directed against almost all the nationals of that country.
HERNAN SANTA CRUZ, STUDY OF DIscRIuMNATIoN IN THE MATrER OF POLITICAL RIGHTS, at
37, U.N. Doc. EICN.4lSub.2/213Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 63.XIV.2, (1962).
293. See supra text accompanying note 47.
294. The Greek Case, 1969 YB. Eur. Conv. H.R. 1, 76 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
295. Dirk Vandewalle, At the Brink- Chaos in Algeria, 9 WORD POL. J. 705, 716 (1992).
296. Algeria: First Round to the Assassins, supra note 22, at 7. See also Wright, supra note 51, at
137 ("After the Algerian coup, Western reaction was notable largely for its passivity.").
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ment which "strongly urged" the Algerian government to uphold its
stated commitments to human rights.
297
Reaction in the U.N. Human Rights Committee 298 was divided,
reflecting the complexity of the issue.299 Some members perceived the
FIS as a genuine threat which justified extreme measures. 3°° Others
raised the question whether the annulling of the elections violated
provisions of the Political Covenant.301 Most members seemed to agree,
however, that even if the FIS victory justified some form of derogation,
the government's open-ended state of emergency and mass suppression
of other civil liberties were disproportionate reactions to the crisis.
30 2
It seems clear that under some circumstances recourse to a state of
emergency will be inevitable if the life of a nation, including its
democratic form of government, is to be saved or at least if the
democratic option is to be preserved. The scope of review by interna-
tional organs in such cases must focus on the probability of the danger
in question on the one hand, and the values to be protected on the
other. This allows for a flexible form of international control which
serves to legitimate the use of this instrument of last resort in certain
extreme cases. By employing such a balanced approach, it would appear
that the Algerian measures could be justified under the circumstances
297. Statement on Algeria Isued at Lisbon on 17 February 1992 by the European Community, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 69 at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/98 (1992).
298. Algeria submitted a report to the Human Rights Committee, as required by article 40
of the Political Covenant, in June 1991. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/-
Add.1 (1991). This report contained no discussion of the elections, which were held five months
later in November. Algeria's comment on these events was limited to an oral presentation to the
Committee, which consisted of vague explanations that "it was impossible to continue the
electoral process" and that the FIS had been dissolved because its leaders had incited violence.
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., 1128 mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CISR.1128
(1992) thereinafter Human Rights Committee, 1128th mtg].
299. In the words of one Committee member, "a paradoxical situation had arisen, in which
the commitment to democratic principles might lead to a situation in which the people's wishes
were no longer respected." Human Rights Committee, 1128th mtg, supra note 298, at 7
(statement of Mr. Sadi).
300. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., 1125th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C-
SR.1125 (1992) [hereinafter Human Rights Committee, 1125th mtg] (statement of Mr. Mavrom-
maris) ("certain anti-democratic parties had abused the democratic process in an effort to seize
power"); id. at 7 (statement of Mr. Dimitrijevic) (describing "attempt of anti-democratic forces
to use the democratic process to come to power"); Human Rights Committee, 1128th mtg, supra
note 298, at 7 (statement of Mr. Sadi) (evidently accepting government's contention that "if the
Islamic Salvation Front took power, it would deal a death blow to the democratic process").
301. Human Rights Committee, 1125th mtg, supra note 300, at 6 (statement of Miss Chanet)
(asking how banning of FIS could be reconciled with art. 25 of the Covenant); see also Human
Rights Committee, 1 125th mtg, supra note 300, at 8 (statement of Mr. Ndiaye) (because Islam
is official religion of Algeria it is unclear "how the Islamic Salvation Front could be considered
a threat to democracy").
302. The Committee asked Algeria to submit a supplemental report detailing the basis for
the state of emergency and its effect on various human rights protected by the Covenant. Human
Rights Committee, 1128th mtg., supra note 298, at 11-12.
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at the time when they were taken. Of course this conclusion speaks
only to the decision to abort the elections; compelling arguments can
be made that other aspects of the crack-down were clearly dispropor-
tionate to the initial threat. Perhaps more importantly, concluding that
derogation was permissible does not make it the preferred form of
action.
As between the legal options available to protect an incumbent
regime in crisis, self-protection legislation, if accompanied by the
procedural safeguards outlined above, can better accomplish the objec-
tive of preserving the democratic character of the society than can a
resort to a state of emergency. We have noted, of course, that a
preemptive law carries risks of its own. Yet properly constituted, it can
achieve its goals without the broad suspension of civil liberties that
usually accompanies a state of emergency.30 3 Thus we conclude that if
a state party chooses to take action against anti-democratic parties, it
should do so preemptively by enacting self-protection legislation rather
than by declaring a state of emergency.
VI. DO STATE PARTIES OWE AN OBLIGATION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO MAINTAIN
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT?
The international community could take one of three positions in
regard to national restrictions on anti-democratic actors: it could forbid
such restrictions, it could allow them under certain conditions, or it
could obligate states to protect themselves against internal subversion.
So far we have addressed only the second question: whether a state may
defend itself against anti-democratic actors. We have concluded that it
may do so under a defined set of circumstances. The question remains,
however, whether there exists an even farther-reaching obligation to
preserve the democratic entitlement. Is it possible that parties to the
Political Covenant. have relinquished the sovereign right to abolish
their democratic form of governance, 3°4 as foreseen by the procedural
model of democracy? Is it possible that a state party is obligated, under
certain circumstances, to enact self-protection legislation? If so, which
policy considerations should inform such a decision?
303. See Tom J. Farer, Elections, Democracy, and Human Rights, 11 HUMAN RTS. Q. 504 (1989).
304. In the Nicaragua case the International Court of Justice held that absent an explicit treaty
commitment on the subject, a state's decision to establish democratic governance is purely a
matter for its domestic jurisdiction. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 249, at 131. It would seem to
follow that the decision to dismantle democratic institutions is also a domestic issue.
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A. The Duty Not to Abolish Democratic Rule
It would seem obvious that the citizens of each state should be the
ones to decide whether they live in a "suicide pact" democracy, in
which the peril of collapse is seen as a necessary price of liberty, or
under a system that sets the limit of permissible political discourse at
advocating destruction of the system itself. This choice would appear
to form an integral part of each society's social contract, whether
metaphorical or actual. If the parties to that contract choose to commit
communal suicide then that decision may not be questioned by out-
siders, for only members of that society hold rights under the contract.
To make a case against this view, one would need to argue that one of
the two classical models of democracy had been excluded by interna-
tional human rights instruments.
If this were a question involving any other human right-such as
the right against torture-the international lawyer would respond that
there are certain things a society cannot choose to do to itself. Where
such other human rights are concerned, international law looks past
the fiction which underlies the social contract metaphor and prescribes
rules regarding individual citizens. The views of political majorities are
simply irrelevant to the validity of such rules. Indeed, these rules are
only meaningful as counter-majoritarian rights, since those in the
political majority can protect themselves from abuse through the nor-
mal political process. 30 5
This response, however, seems inappropriate in the case of the demo-
cratic entitlement. In the scenario we have examined, a majority or
plurality of voters chooses to elect an anti-democratic government,
thereby waiving its right to participate in future elections. The demo-
cratic entitlement, which acquires meaning only when the preferences
of voting groups--especially majorities-are honored, requires that the
victorious candidates assume office. If international law discards this
result, how can it claim to uphold the democratic entitlement? The
substantive model of democracy would respond that this entitlement
protects not only present but also future voting majorities. To the
procedural model, however, it seems illogical to take steps that deny
the majority's preferences in the name of preserving the right to
majority rule.
The heart of this dilemma lies in the social contract model generally
thought to provide the normative foundation for majoritarian political
processes: the citizens of a state contract among themselves to create a
democratic constitution. International law, from this perspective, can
only serve the role of supporting a citizenry's choice of one of the two
forms of democratic governance. It cannot dictate the selection of one
305. See ELY, supra note 111.
1995 / Intolerant Democracies
or the other. Because the international community plays no part in the
choice-that is, in the formation of the social contract-it holds no
rights under the contract, and thus cannot prevent a state from com-
mitting political suicide by following the procedural model. 30 6 Nor can
it look past the contract in the name of protecting minority rights,
since the right in question is that of majority rule.
For one simple reason, however, this classical perspective no longer
holds: the various citizenries of parties to the Political Covenant have
made a binding commitment to the international community to hold
"genuine periodic elections." By committing themselves to the demo-
cratic entitlement, parties have necessarily rejected the possibility en-
visaged by the procedural model that a citizenry may waive its demo-
cratic entitlement. In social contract parlance, this means that parties
to human rights conventions, by undertaking an obligation to govern
by majority rule, have added the international community as a party
to their national covenants. While the primary rights still accrue to
individual citizens, human rights instruments empower the interna-
tional community to act as a kind of contractual guarantor when those
primary rights are denied. In this role-acting on behalf of the citi-
zenry-the international community may protect the democratic enti-
tlement whether or not a majority of citizens at a particular moment
chooses to reject its democratic institutions. 30 7
The international community has good reason to take this position.
The idea that one state's commitment to democratic principles may
also serve the collective interests of the international community pre-
dates the contemporary human right to political participation. It traces
its origins to Kant's conception of a separate peace among liberal
nations,308 the notion that states whose citizens have a say in public
affairs are less likely to go to war with each other.3°9 Many justifications
have been offered for this hypothesis. 310 One explanation, recently
elaborated by Bruce Russett, is particularly relevant to the notion of a
306. Traditional social contract theory had two variants. The first saw the agreement as
bilateral, between "the people" and the government or state. The second saw it as an agreement
among the people to establish a government or state. The international community would hold
no rights under either variation.
307. It does not follow that the existence of this guaranty permits recourse to force on the
part of states or international organizations. Whether unilateral pro-democratic invasion is
permissible under international law or whether denial of the democratic entitlement could be
designated a "threat to the peace" by the U.N. Security Council are entirely separate questions.
308. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (1795), in KANT. POUTICAL WRITINGS 93 (H.B. Nisbet
trans., 1991). Michael W. Doyle has been the most prominent contemporary proponent of this
notion. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, (pts. 1 & 2) 12 PHmIL. &
PUB. AFF. 205 (1983), 12 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 323 (1983); Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and
World Politics, 80 &1. PoL Scr. REv. 1151 (1986).
309. See BRUCE RussETr, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993) (summarizing and
discussing recent literature on the subject).
310. See id. at 24-42.
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binding international commitment to preserve democratic institutions.
Russett argues that the theory of democratic societies, as well as their
regular patterns of behavior, creates powerful incentives against the
resolution of conflicts by violence. A host of alternative mechanisms,
as well as the perception that dissent and ideological conflict are not
necessarily threats to the health of the polity, operate as powerful
constraints on the resort to force. 311 Russett argues that these traits
characterize not only internal democratic politics but also relations
between democratic states:
The norms of regulated political competition, compromise solu-
tions to political conflicts, and peaceful transfer of power are
externalized by democracies in their dealing with other national
actors in world politics. On the other hand, nondemocracies may
not externalize these norms. Hence, when two democracies come
into a conflict of interest, they are able to apply democratic norms
in their interaction, and these norms prevent most conflicts from
mounting to the threat or use of military force. 3 12
Few claim that democratic constitutionalism alone can effectively
check a resort to military aggression. Kant himself wrote of the need
for a "pacific union" among states; an organization resembling a col-
lective security arrangement designed "to preserve and secure the free-
dom of each state in itself."313 Yet even if the correlation is less than
absolute, it is nonetheless powerful.314 Theorists such as Russett de-
scribe a community of democratic states that is by its nature coopera-
tive rather than confrontational, and that is predisposed to finding
value in the rule of law among its members. Both traits are consistent
with the notion of an agreement among such states to preserve each
other's democratic institutions. In this sense, the Kantian thesis em-
bodies a normative proposition: the adoption of nonviolent forms of
dispute resolution by democratic cultures in both the internal and
external realms. This normative aspect of the Kantian thesis can be
seen explicitly today in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and its subsequent binding instruments, many of whose drafters shared
the Kantian view.
311. Ia at 33-38.
312. Id. at 33.
313. Kant, supra note 308, at 104.
314. Rawls has written recently that "the absence of war between democracies is as close as
anything we know to an empirical law in relations between societies." John Rawls, The Law of
Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGmHa: THiE OxFoRD AMNESTY LEcTUREs 41, 58 (Stephen Shute &
Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
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As one of the drafters of the Political Covenant noted in debate over
the right to political participation (Article 25), "when citizens could
really express their views on the conduct of the State's affairs, the
danger of its recourse to aggression was practically non-existent. Hence
the best way of maintaining peace was to give the citizens an oppor-
tunity to choose between peace and war.' 315 A broader and more recent
statement of the Kantian thesis appears in the 1993 Vienna Declaration
on human rights, which describes efforts by the U.N. system to pro-
mote human rights as contributing "to the stability and well-being
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, and to
impgoved conditions for peace and security."
316
For our purposes it is not necessary to accept or reject the Kantian
thesis as an empirical matter, though the historical data in support of
the thesis are impressive. 317 What is crucial is: (1) that the norms of
openness, cooperation, and non-violent resolution of disputes which
typify theories of democratic societies arguably carry over into relations
between such societies; and (2) that the drafters of the Political Cove-
nant evidently believed that the "suicide" of a democracy is of concern
not only to its own citizens but to the international community as
well. The prospects for collective peace suffer through the demise of
an important control on aggressive behavior. As Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali has stated rather bluntly, "Democracies almost never
fight each other. Democratization supports the cause of peace." 318 Seen
in this light, the democratic entitlement serves as riot only a human
right enacted "merely" in the interest of individual citizens, but as one
of the important legal bulwarks of world peace.
2. The Duty to Adopt Self-Protective Measures
The duty not to abolish democratic rule does not necessarily entail
a complementary duty to adopt self-protective measures. The Political
315. U.N. ESCOR, 9th Sess., 363d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.363 (1953) (statement
of Mr. Jevremovic).
316. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157123, at 5 (1993).
For a comprehensive listing of international instruments and declarations linking respect for
human rights with international peace, see the report of the Sub-Commission of the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, Interrelationship Between Human Rights and International Peace, 40th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. EICN.4ISub.2/198812 (1988).
317. See Anne-Marie Burley, Toward an Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 395
(1992); Brad Roberts, Democracy and World Order, 15 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 9 (1991);
Russ=r, supra note 309, at 3-23. The nature of the 'democracy" established in developing
countries may stray quite far from the western model from which the Kantian thesis takes much
of its force; as a result, these societies' propensity to non-violence may be concomitantly weaker.
See Robert L. Rothstein, Democracy, Conflict and Development in the Third World, WASH. Q., Spring
1991, at 43.
318. Bourros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later, ORBIS: J. WORLD Ass., Summer
1993, at 328.
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Covenant, in language echoed by all other human rights treaties,
requires state parties "to adopt such legislative or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect" to this and other enumerated rights.319
This rule describes states' obligations at a very general level: if, in order
to ensure the continuation of democratic rule, it is necessary to adopt
measures of self-protection, then they must be adopted. The more
difficult problem lies in determining the circumstances under which
such a "necessity" arises. The existence and form of legislation necessary
to accomplish the goal of self-preservation will vary from state to
state. 320 In states which face, or may face, real threats from anti-demo-
cratic groups, self-protective legislation may be necessary. In others,
with few such threats either in their history or in their contemporary
political landscape, self-protective legislation may not be needed. 321
These principles suggest that the question of whether self-protective
legislation is required in a particular state will be an extremely difficult
and fact-intensive inquiry. Reaching a well-informed conclusion will
often be beyond the capabilities of both judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies, not only because of the extensive fact-finding that will be
entailed, but also because of the political judgments that will be
needed on many of the questions raised above. Commissions of inquiry
such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which
prepare in-depth reports on the situation in individual countries, may
be able to master the factual side of the problem. Their conclusions on
the political question of whether a state's democratic institutions are
in extremis, however, will often be very controversial. Despite the
difficulty of determining whether self-protective measures must be
taken in particular cases, it is important for the international commu-
nity to provide recourse to an impartial body which can make such
determinations.
An important objection to this approach arises from the Algerian
case. It could be argued that a duty to adopt self-protective measures
cannot exist because the incumbent, quasi-democratic regime is not
319. Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
320. The Human Rights Committee has noted, for example, that in societies where forms of
discrimination are especially pervasive and entrenched, the Covenant may require a government
to take special "affirmative action," involving the temporary granting of preferential treatment
to the affected groups, in order to fulfill its treaty obligations. International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Human Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPRJC/21/Rev. l/Add.l, at 9-10 (1989).
521. Justice Douglas, in a dissent opposing restrictions on Communist Party activities in the
United States, echoed this view in a passage which strikes today's reader as rather self-righteous:
Some nations less resilient than the United States, where illiteracy is high and where
democratic traditions are only budding, might have to take drastic steps and jail these men
merely for speaking their creed. But in America they are miserable merchants of unwanted
ideas; their wares remain unsold. The fact that their ideas are abhorrent does not make them
powerful.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 588-89 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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obligated to guarantee that elections are held after it leaves office.
Rather, new elections are an obligation of the anti-democratic successor
regime. According to this view, the democratic entitlement in Algeria
would only have obligated an FIS government to hold elections after
the expiration of its term in office.322 If it failed to do so, and instead
established a theocracy, the FIS government would have violated Al-
geria's human rights obligations. The international community would
then consider the matter, and would hopefully respond decisively. This
approach, however, would prevent the incumbent Algerian government
from preemptively defending the democratic entitlement. It suggests
that one regime is not entitled to prevent another from taking power
on the basis of mere speculation that the successor regime may not
respect the human right to democratic governance.
This formal approach, while containing an appealing logic, involves
a degree of brinkmanship which the drafters of the Political Covenant
found unacceptable. To argue that the FIS should have been permitted
to take charge of the Algerian electoral process is to hope for a
democratic conversion by an openly anti-democratic party. This is the
Weimar "mistake" the Covenant's drafters sought to avoid. Article 5(1)
of the Covenant was included precisely to allow for preemptive action
where an obviously anti-democratic threat exists.3 23 Article 2(2) of the
Covenant, requiring parties to take the steps necessary to ensure respect
for protected rights, cannot allow a government to shift responsibility
for preserving human rights, including the democratic entitlement, if
it is the last actor with a realistic possibility of doing so. The common
law of torts recognizes a similar duty born of necessity in the "last clear
chance" doctrine.
This argument would lose its force only if a potentially anti-demo-
cratic regime were free to discard its international obligations by
renouncing the Covenant in a timely manner. Presumably, it would do
so well in advance of the next scheduled election. Because the Covenant
contains no provision for unilateral termination, however, a state must
be deemed to have incurred its obligations indefinitely.324
3. Policy Considerations
A state's duty to adopt measures "necessary" for self-protection does
not mean that such steps should be taken lightly or without a careful
322. This has been suggested by Middle East Watch in its report on Algeria. Human Rights
in Algeria, supra note 16, at 16-17. Clearly the "democratic" nature of the incumbents was
questionable at best. Their claim to democratic bonafides rests primarily on the relative fairness
of the December 1991 elections, which they initiated and supervised.
323. Tomschat, supra note 27, at 33.
324. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 238, art. 56.
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weighing of the consequences. In fact, there are several strong argu-
ments at the level of prudence, rather than law, for identifying condi-
tions of necessity with extreme caution.
First, the right to ban certain political parties carries with it an
enormous potential for abuse. Virtually every democracy can point to
shameful episodes in its history in which alleged "subversives"-who
often espoused legitimate social grievances 325 -were denied political
rights. The example of Chile is instructive. The 1980 Chilean consti-
tution contained a clause permitting bans on parties advocating, among
other things, a totalitarian political order.326 This provision was used
to deprive virtually all Communist Party members of their rights of
expression and association,327 and was a specific reaction by junta leader
General Augusto Pinochet to the election of Salvador Allende as Presi-
dent in 1970. While the clause clearly went beyond the restrictions
permitted by international human rights instruments, it is sympto-
matic of the danger inherent in legitimating any party restrictions in
the name of protecting democracy. What better cloak for those seeking
to consolidate absolute control over a political system than that of
claiming to be the saviors of democracy?
A second problem is determining whether a political movement
constitutes a threat to democratic institutions. The human rights
instruments we have reviewed require more than the mere identifica-
tion of anti-democratic beliefs. Rather, they require "acts" or "activi-
ties" "aimed at the destruction of . . .rights."328 In a judicial-type
inquiry, however, absent an overt breach of the peace, such evidence
will be rare and often contradictory.329 Few parties will call for an
outright end to future elections. Others may adopt the rhetoric of
325. See EMERSON, supra note 60, at 51-52.
326. Article 8 of the 1980 Chilean Constitution provided:
Any action by an individual or group intended to propagate doctrines which ate antagonistic
to the family, or which advocate violence or a concept of society, the State or the juridical
order, of a totalitarian character or based on class warfare, is illegal and contrary to the
institutional code of the Republic. The organizations and political movements or parties
which, due to their purposes or the nature of the activities of their members, tend toward
such objectives, are unconstitutional . . . .Without impairment of the other sanctions
established by the Constitution or the law, persons who incur or who should have incurred
the aforementioned violations shall not, for a period of ten years from the date of the
Tribunal's decision, be eligible for public duties or positions, regardless as to whether they
should or should not be obtained through popular vote.
CHILE CoNsT., Art. 8.
327. See Note, Abridging Freedom of Expression in the Name of Protecting Democracy: Th. Case of
Article 8 of the Chilean Constitution (undated) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors), We
would like to thank Professor Allejandro Garro of Columbia University Law School for providing
information in this section.
328. See article 5 of the Political Covenant, supra note 5, art. 5.
329. See Carl J. Friedrich & Arthur E. Sutherland, Defense of the Constitutional Order, in STUDIES
IN FDERaiLsM 683 (Robert R. Bowie & Carl J. Friedrich eds., 1954).
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committed democrats as a tactical device.330 Justice Robert Jackson,
concurring in the United States Supreme Court's upholding of restric-
tions on Communist Party activity, acknowledged this difficulty:
[to find) that petitioner's conduct creates a 'clear and present
danger' of violent overthrow, we must appraise imponderables,
including international and national phenomena which baffle the
best informed foreign offices and our most experienced politicians.
We would have to foresee and predict the effectiveness of Com-
munist propaganda, opportunities for infiltration, whether, and
when, a time will come that they consider propitious for action,
and whether and how fast our existing government will deteriorate
.... The judicial process is simply not adequate to a trial of such
far-flung issues. The answers given would reflect our own political
predilections and nothing more.331
Third, both the substantive and procedural models of democracy,
articulating the legal tension between speech and association rights for
some and political rights for all, represent hypotheses concerning hu-
man behavior in addition to being arguments from principle. Both
make arguments concerning the best way to curb the dark side of
human nature, the side susceptible to persuasion by authoritarian
movements. The substantive view is skeptical about citizens' capacity,
to resist the allure of these movements. The procedural view, as evinced
by Jefferson's faith in the remedial power of open debate, is optimistic.
While data exist both to prove and disprove these hypotheses, the
information comes mostly from established democracies. 332 Dangers to
the democratic entitlement, however, are most prevalent in new and
nascent democracies. In these states, it is very difficult to predict how
citizens will react to authoritarian movements. If such movements are
successfully resisted, a strong civil society emerges, and the interna-
tional community should welcome such developments, however achieved.
It may be counter-productive to criticize the state's actions simply
because the means involved-self-protective legislation, for example-
do not conform to preconceived notions of how democracy is best
preserved.
Fourth, special care must be taken in the case of newly established
democracies. As the Russian experience suggests, the period immedi-
330. See David Reisman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, 3 PUB. POL. 33, 56 (1992).
331. Dennis, 341 U.S. 570 (Jackson, J., concurring). Early in its history, the Supreme Court
indeed refused to decide which of two competing factions constituted the lawful government of
a state, citing the absence of judicially manageable standards to guide its decision. Luther v.
Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849).
332. Raymond M. Dutch & James L. Gibson, Putting Up With Fascists in Western Europe: A
Comparative, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance, 45 W. POL. Q. 236, 238 (1992).
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ately following an emergence from authoritarian rule can be marked
by extreme instability, as various factions vie to create a new political
identity for the state.333 In such situations, two equally powerful, but
contradictory, arguments could be made regarding the advisability of
restricting anti-democratic actors.
One might argue that given the fragility of newly formed demo-
cratic civil societies, and, in particular, the prevalent distrust of motives
among political opponents, to legitimate bans would simply confirm
their mutual suspicions and lead quickly to polarized societies. On this
view, there can be no worse beginning to a democratic experiment than
to allow the first regime to achieve power to begin banning other actors
from the process.
However, one might well argue the opposite. From this perspective,
the boundaries of legitimate political advocacy must be made clear at
the very outset. If one believes as a general matter that opponents of
majority rule have no right to participate in the majoritarian process,
then that norm is best established before anti-democratic parties gather
strength. This argument can also be stated on a more theoretical level.
The transition to democracy is often secured only after long struggles
against authoritarian regimes, sometimes taking the form of violent
revolution. The right of revolution against undemocratic regimes is at
the core of traditional democratic theory. Given the legitimacy of such
acts, it would seem anomalous to hold that anti-democratic parties
cannot be restricted during their ascension to power when the possi-
bility of their defeat is much greater. From the perspective of political
morality, the former (anti-democratic revolution) would appear to le-
gitimize the latter (restricting anti-democratic parties) afortiori.334
Finally, the international community should recognize that choices
of whether to ban anti-democratic parties mark important episodes in
a state's democratic development. 335 Mistakes made in the short term-
arguably the case in the United States with the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798, the Espionage Act of 1917, the Smith Act of 1940, the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and the Communist Control
Act of 1954 -may become valuable negative lessons over time. These
are lessons that the international community is unlikely to impart in
any meaningful fashion by fiat. Thus, while the international commu-
nity may define a permissible range of responses to authoritarian move-
ments, it should not dictate a choice among them.
333. TED R. GuRtR, MINOrIaES AT RisK 137-38 (1993) (discussing the risks of instability
and civil war in democratizing autocracies).
334. See Auerbach, supra note 64, at 192-93; but see EMERSON, supra note 60, at 49-50
(responding to Auerbach).
335. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJuST WARs 86-108 (2d ed. 1992); Michael Walzer,
The Moral Standing of States, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209 (1980).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The growing recognition in international law and practice of a
democratic entitlement represents an emerging consensus among states
regarding the nature of a "democratic" society. Given the ideological
and cultural obstacles in the path of reaching such a consensus, it is
not surprising that the earliest points of agreement have been on
questions of procedure: what is a "free and fair" election; must more
than one party participate; must ballots be secret? At first glance, the
problem of dealing with anti-democratic actors might be seen as yet
another procedural question. All electoral systems have rules concern-
ing who may participate and who may not. This might simply be one
more.
However, the issue transcends procedure. Whether a political. system
elevates tolerance above all other values is a fundamental choice that
defines the nature of the polity itself, not simply the rules of engage-
ment between those who have agreed to compete within its boundaries.
The choice itself generally does not occur at a singular moment in a
state's history but rather emerges from the tumult of struggles, de-
bates, wars, and the daily experiences of governing that together create
the social and political identity of a society. These observations might
lead one to be quite pessimistic about the possibility of agreement on
a global legal standard. The body of this Article, however, has demon-
strated that the international community is not hopelessly divided on
the problem of anti-democratic actors. Sources of law that include
human rights treaties, the decisions of human rights bodies, United
Nations practice in election monitoring, and the practices of repre-
sentative democratic states all point overwhelmingly to a substantive
theory of democracy. Even the United States-which entered reserva-
tions to the Political Covenant's articles on freedom of expression on
the grounds that they would erode the First Amendment's tolerance of
virtually any political opinion, however dangerous or offensive 33 6--
bears a legacy of debilitating restrictions on the American Communist
Party. The international community thus seems to have adopted a
substantive view of democracy as a legal norm.
International law has developed various mechanisms for separating
actions with normative significance from "mere" politics. Yet here is a
norm that is about politics. It seeks to inject the rule of law into
societies facing challenges to their fundamental institutions by well-
organized extremist groups. Inevitably, even in the most optimistic
scenario, the strict letter of these rules will be tempered to accommo-
date political exigencies. Bans on parties with substantial followings
336. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992).
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may cause unrest; bans on parties with little support serve as instru-
ments of repression; and bans of either sort may be enacted based on
evidence that is not much more than speculation. This Article has been
filled with responses to such prudential concerns. The standards dis-
cussed are calibrated to take account of such potential pitfalls. The
necessity of a procedural check, in the form of an independent review,
is also essential if abuses of the power to exclude anti-democratic actors
are to be curtailed.
Yet the question remains of how a norm about politics can stand
apart from politics. It may be that, for the time being, the international
community must recognize that a rule embodying a substantive view
of democracy-requiring that restrictions on anti-democratic parties
be "reasonable"-may be ignored, or used as convenient cover for
repression. Realistically, the best that the community may hope for is
that the consequences of a decision to ban a party will not result in
the collapse of a state's democratic system altogether. Using institu-
tional carrots and sticks to encourage a return to full pluralism may
prevent this result. Through this minimally interventionist route, the
international community may slowly bring about adherence to the
letter of the norms themselves.
